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Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting
Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA
Provide a Remedy?
Joan Vogel*
The recent sharp increase in the cost of medical and disability bene-
fits has prompted employers to take a variety of defensive measures.
Some have reorganized their plans to reduce benefits.' Others have
taken a different approach: they discharge-or refuse to hire-employees
who have become or are thought likely to become seriously ill.2 Ad-
vances in genetic and other medical screening procedures are likely to
increase this latter trend. Most scholarly commentary has focused on
whether federal antidiscrimination laws forbid excluding employees who
are or may be susceptible to occupational diseases.3 Curiously, very little
commentary has addressed relief under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA), a statute specifically designed to safeguard
workers' pensions and other employee benefits. 4
This Article will explore whether and to what extent ERISA provides
redress for employees who are discharged or otherwise disadvantaged
because they are considered insurance risks. In general, section 510 pro-
hibits employers from taking action against participants or beneficiaries 5
for exercising any right to which they are entitled under their benefit
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, J.D. UCLA, 1981. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the assistance of Richard Delgado, Marley Weiss, William Payne, and Michael Goldberg in the
preparation of this Article.
1 See Bernstein, Chopping Health Care Costs: Labor Picks Up An Ax, Bus. WK., March 31, 1986, at
78-80; Sieverts, Health Cost Containment Strategies, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK §§ 22-1 to 25 (F.
Foulkes ed. Supp. 1985); Spring, Medical Benefit Plan Costs, 29 PERSONNEL ADMIN. 64-72 (1984); Stone
& Reitz, Health Care Cost Containment and Its Impact on Employee Relations, 29 PERSONNEL ADMIN. 27, 27-
28 (1984); Walsh, Health Cost Containment Strategies, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK §§ 22-1 to 22-4
(F. Foulkes ed. 1982).
2 The employer may also be concerned with medical claims filed by the employee's spouse and
children. Most health insurance plans cover spouses and dependent children. See Bittner v. Sadoff&
Rudoy Indust., 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984) (employer fired employee for bringing action to chal-
lenge termination of benefits for his son's illness).
3 See i fra note 43.
4 ERISA §§ 1-4082, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). This Article, which focuses on the anti-
retaliation provisions of ERISA, is part of a larger study the author is conducting of the role of
antiretaliation principles in American law generally. A forthcoming article surveys several areas of
U.S. law in which an individual when acting for an impermissible purpose is barred from taking
action that would normally be permissible, in particular when he or she is retaliating for another's
previous exercise of a statutory or constitutional right. American scholarship lacks a coherent theory
of antiretaliation law. The article will compare the experience of other legal systems in an effort to
formulate fair and just antiretaliation laws and principles in the United States.
5 A participant is an employee or former employee who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit from an employee benefit plan. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 100 1(7) (1982). Also, note that a
"1participant" may not include all employees but only employees who are or will be eligible for bene-
fits under the terms of the plan. Probationary or part-time employees may not be participants in
health and disability insurance plans if they are not covered. A beneficiary is a person designated by
a participant to receive benefits or a person who can receive benefits under the terms of a plan. 29
U.S.C. § 1001(8) (1982).
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plans or the Act or from interfering with the attainment of any right
under the Act or a plan.6 Congress included this provision in ERISA
6 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). See also Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834
(3d Cir. 1987); Zipfv. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986); Burke v. Latrobe Steel
Co., 775 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1985); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1167 (1986);
Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nor., Brooks v. Burling-
ton Indus., Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986); Crouch v. Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d
805 (10th Cir. 1984); Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 566 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Mass.
1983), rev'd, 730 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984); Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy
Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984);
Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F.
Supp. 571 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983); Kross v. Western Elec.
Co., 534 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983);
Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039
(1982); Marquardt v. North Am. Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1981); Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1687 (1981); West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980); Drinkwater v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 85-4468-Y (D. Mass. May 21, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
File); Donohue v. Custom Management Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1190 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Bemis v. Hogue,
635 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Quattrochi v. Allied Chem. Corp., 633 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Pa.
1986); Barnes v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 631 F. Supp. 248 (D. Minn. 1986); Corum v. Farm Credit
Servs., 628 F. Supp. 707 (D. Minn. 1986); Lackus v. Acme Mkts., Inc., No. 85-1341 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 29,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File); Brill v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, No. 82 C 7973 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Hamann v.
International Harvester Co., No. 84 C 10552 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file), aft'd, 801 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1986); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 447 (N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1986); Inglis v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., No. 85-1344 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Beckwith v.
International Mill Servs., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum and
Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1984); McKay v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,
605 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ferguson v. Freedom Forge Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Pa.
1985); Shipper v. Avon Prods., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fischer v. Doremus & Co.,
No. 83 C 8214 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File); Garry v. TRW, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 157 (N.D. Ohio 1985); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J.
1985); Corkery v. SuperX Drugs Corp., 602 F. Supp. 42 (M.D. Fla. 1985); King v. James River-
Pepperell, Inc., 592 F. Supp 54 (D. Mass.), later proceeding, 593 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Mass. 1984); Citro
v. TRW, Inc., No. C82 2911 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Bumpers v.
International Mill Servs., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1984), later proceeding, Beckwith v. Interna-
tional Mill Servs., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Wilke v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 84 C
1352 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Toni v. National Business Forms
Co., No. 84 C 1541 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Goins v. Teamsters
Local 639-Employers Health & Pension Trust, 598 F. Supp. 1151 (D.D.C. 1984); Folz v. Marriott
Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Con-
trol, 591 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Watkinson v. Great At. and Pac. Tea Co., 585 F. Supp. 879
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Korn v. Levine Bros. Iron Works Corp., 574 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Kelly v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 573 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd mew., 746 F.2d 1467 (3d
Cir. 1984); Watson v. Fuller Brush Co., 570 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Shestina v. Cotter &
Co., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 674, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,094 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Il1. 1983); Maxfield v. Central States.
Southeast and Southwest Areas Health, Welfare & Pension Funds, 559 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 3 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1311 (W.D. Pa.), later proceeding, 3
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2023 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp.
983 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd mere., 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983); Shefton v. U.S. Steel Corp.. 2 Em-
ployee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Utah 1981); Silverman v. Wilmit, No. 79 Civ. 6736 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); International Molders and Allied Workers Union v.
Aquarius Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 770 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986); Turner v. CF&I Corp., 510 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1981); McGinnis v.
Joyce,.507 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Il. 1981); Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.
Mo. 1979); Lucas v. Warner & Swasey Co., 475 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Baeten v. Van Ess,
474 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 979, 464 N.E.2d 1245
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primarily to prevent employers from circumventing the Act's require-
ments by firing employees before their pension benefits vested. 7 The
provision is not limited to pension benefits, however, but extends to wel-
fare benefits, such as medical and disability insurance, which are as im-
portant to employees as pensions.
A number of recent decisions addressed medical insurance and
other welfare benefits lost when the employee suffered illness or incapac-
ity. 8 This Article will examine an area where the case law is sparse:
where health problems arise outside the job setting. Section 510, its his-
tory, the subsequent case law and similar antidiscrimination laws should
yield an approach under which employees may recover under ERISA
when their employer improperly deprives them of their medical and disa-
bility benefits.
Part I of this Article will analyze the economic incentives under med-
ical and disability insurance plans that employers have to eliminate medi-
cally risky employees. Part II will explore four situations where these
incentives are especially strong: (1) when the employee reports an illness
or injury; (2) when medical or genetic testing identifies employees as a
greater than average risk of incurring serious illnesses; (3) when the em-
ployer learns that the employee has an unhealthful lifestyle; and (4) when
absenteeism serves as a proxy for a medical condition. Part III will show
how courts should analyze claims in such settings. In particular, it will
show that section 510's provisions may be interpreted and extended by
borrowing principles and approaches from cases interpreting other re-
medial labor legislation, such as Title VII,9 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 10 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). i t
Part III will also explore what defenses should be available to employers
and what remedies are appropriate if the employee prevails.
I. The Structure of Health and Disability Insurance Plans
Unlike pension plans, ERISA imposes few substantive requirements
on insurance plans. Minimum funding, participation and vesting re-
quirements do not apply to welfare benefits; employers have great lati-
tude in structuring them. 12 As a result, the benefits available under
(1984), aft'd, 109 Ill. 2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985); Imler v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 Kans.
App. 2d 71, 650 P.2d 712 (1982).
7 S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4838,
4872; West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 243-45 (6th Cir. 1980).
8 See cases cited supra note 6.
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982).
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
11 N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), in relevant part, provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
12 ERISA §§ (1) & 2(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1) & 2(a) (1982), distinguishes between welfare and
pension benefit plans:
For purposes of this subchapter:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan,
fund, or program which was established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan ... was established or.. . maintained
1026 [Vol. 62:1024
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health and disability insurance plans vary widely from employer to em-
ployer. 13 For example, medical insurance plans may pay various
amounts or percentages of medical expenses, cover certain procedures
and not others, and require the employee to pay some of the cost of the
insurance premiums. 14 Disability plans, which provide lost income to in-
jured or sick employees, vary with respect to eligibility requirements,
percentages of wages or salaries paid and the length of time over which
the employee can receive benefits.15 Thus, the more comprehensive and
generous the benefits, the greater the costs to the employer if the em-
ployee or insured dependent becomes ill or injured.
Despite the variation in benefits offered, most medical and disability
benefits are administered and financed in similar ways. For nonunion
and most union employees, benefit plans are administered by the em-
ployer alone. 16 For union employees in multibargaining units, benefit
plans are jointly administered by Taft-Hartley trusts. 17 To satisfy the re-
quirements of the Labor Management Relations Act, payments must be
made to a trust fund administered by an equal number of union and
management trustees, payments must be made as specified in a written
agreement, and all disputes which end in a deadlock must be submitted
to an impartial arbitrator.' 8 With a Taft-Hartley trust, the employer's
responsibility is normally limited to making payments under the collec-
tive bargaining agreements. As a result, relatively few disputes arise and
those that do rarely include claims of discrimination.' 9 Where the em-
for the purpose of providing... (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or bene-
fits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation bene-
fits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c)(5) of [the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act], (other than pension on retirement or death .... )
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee pension benefit
plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was.., maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms
or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termina-
tion of covered employment or beyond ....
See also ERISA §§ 201 & 301, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051 & 1081 (1982) (vesting, participation, and
funding requirements do not apply to welfare benefit plans); Hansen v. White Farm Equip. Co., 5
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2130, 2137 (N.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 1186
(6th Cir. 1986).
13 Unlike medical insurance plans, disability plans can be provided either through a welfare or a
pension plan. See Brown, Disability Benefit Plans, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK §§ 18-25 (F.
Foulkes ed. 1982).
14 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS
139-45 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS].
15 Id. at 187-91.
16 See R.D. COOPER, MULTIEMPLOYER HEALTH AND WELFARE PLAN OPERATIONS AND EXPENSES 14
(1983). N. LEVIN, ERISA AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT BENEFIT FUNDS 1, 4-5 (1975) [hereinafter LEVIN].
17 Labor Management Relations Act § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982), governs the
structure ofjointly administered plans. Jointly administered plans can be found in single employee
bargaining units but they are not common. See N. LEVIN, supra note 16, at 245; D. McGINN, JOINT
TRUST PENSION PLANS 9-12 (1978).
18 LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982).
19 There are only four cases involving jointly administered trust funds. These cases are as fol-
lows: Crouch v. Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1984); Brill v. Central
States, Pension Fund, No. 82 C 7973 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
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ployer administers the plans, as is the case with most plans, the employer
has more opportunity to single out and take action against employees
with medical risks. Moreover, the employer has far more medical infor-
mation about employees and their dependents than when the benefit is
administered by a third party.
Medical and disability insurance benefits are provided and paid for
in three different ways. The most common method is for the company to
purchase a group insurance policy from an insurance company. The in-
surance company then processes and pays all meritorious claims, deter-
mining the amount of the premium by the employer's experience rating.
If employees and their families submit many expensive claims, the cost of
the insurance premium will rise, and the employer may be tempted to
eliminate the workers responsible. 20
The second alternative is self-funding or self-insurance. 2' In a self-
funded plan, the employer, rather than a third party insurer, directly pays
for its employees' medical and disability claims. 22 Self-insured plans are
commonly used by large, multistate employers. These plans save admin-
istrative costs, avoid the burden of complying with state insurance regu-
lations, and give the employer considerable freedom in designing the
plan. 23 If the employer is paying the benefit claims directly, then it will
be concerned about employees who have or might contract catastrophic
diseases. As claim-processor, the employer also acquires extensive
knowledge about its employees' health.24
The third way is for the employer to have a self-insured plan which is
administered and designed by an insurance company. The employer
then has the advantages of self-insurance, in particular the ability to cir-
cumvent state regulation and flexibility in designing the benefits, while
leaving the day-to-day administrative tasks to the insurance company.25
Even though an insurance company processes the claims, the employer
still has the same concern about costs as in the other two administrative
and funding arrangements. In all three approaches, the employer is in a
position to acquire a good deal of information about its employees'
health histories. 26
The administration and funding of disability benefits can be some-
Goins v. Teamsters Local 639 Employers Health and Pension Trust, 598 F. Supp. 1151 (D.D.C.
1984); Maxfield v. Central States Welfare and Pension Funds, 559 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
20 Walsh, supra note 1, §§ 22-7 to 22-8.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. Although ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982), preempts all state laws which "re-
late to any employee benefit plans," ERISA § 514(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2), preserves state laws
which regulate insurance. Therefore, if the plan purchases a policy from an insurance company. that
policy is subject to state regulation including state laws which mandate that medical policies include
coverage for certain medical procedures. However, employers can avoid these laws if the plan is
self-insured. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
24 Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (W.D. Mo. 1984). In a much-cited case, an
employee was discharged shortly after informing his employer that he was diagnosed as suffering
from multiple sclerosis. The court indicated that because the employer's medical plan was self-
insured, the employer had an economic incentive to discharge the employee once it became aware
that he was likely to file large medical claims.
25 Walsh, supra note 1, § 22-8.
26 Brown, supra note 13, §§ 18-21.
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what different from that of medical insurance. The employer can provide
disability benefits as separate welfare benefits or as part of a pension
plan. 27 There are two general types of disability benefits: Short and long
term. Short term benefits typically include sick pay plans and formal ac-
cident and sickness plans. When an employee qualifies for sick pay, the
employer usually continues to pay his or her full salary for a specified
period. The employer typically purchases an accident and sickness
(A&S) plan from an insurance company. These plans provide a certain
percentage of the employee's wages or salary, usually for twenty-six
weeks. A&S benefits are normally available to the employee after a wait-
ing period and after sick pay is exhausted. If the employee meets the
eligibility criteria, the employer provides long term disability benefits
either through a pension plan or by means of insurance. The benefits
under a long term disability insurance plan can last several years or even
until retirement. Disability pension plans usually provide lost income
until the normal retirement age of sixty-five. 28 If the employer is provid-
ing benefits over a long period of time, it is thus concerned with the
number of employees who will need these benefits. When the costs of
medical and disability benefits are added together, serious injuries and
chronic or catastrophic diseases can cost an employer an enormous
amount of money. Many employers, understandably, will consider
means of reducing these expenses.
II. Targeting Medical Risks
Rising insurance costs, together with rapid advances in medical
screening, place employees in jeopardy of losing their jobs if their em-
ployer believes they need or will need extensive medical and disability
insurance benefits. This section will explore four general ways that the
employer might seek to lower its insurance costs: 29 (1) by dismissing sick
and injured employees; (2) by medical testing and screening of employ-
ees and terminating those who test positive; (3) by identifying and dis-
charging employees with unhealthful lifestyles; and 4) by establishing
rules on absenteeism which result in discharging employees before they
qualify for benefits.
During the course of their work lives, many persons will become sick
or injured and will need to file substantial medical and disability claims.
Most also have medical and disability insurance obtained through their
employment. Insurance, especially medical insurance, is crucial to re-
ceiving medical care in this country. If employees can lose their jobs just
because they need their insurance or if they can be fired because they
27 FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 14, at 189-90.
28 Brown, supra note 13, §§ 18-21.
29 Unlike other federal antidiscrimination statutes, ERISA § 510 covers both participants (em-
ployees) and beneficiaries (spouses and children). If an employer takes action against an employee
because of a spouse's or child's medical claims, then ERISA creates a cause of action. See, e.g., Bitt-
ner v. Sardoff& Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 728 F.2d
820 (7th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff claimed that he was fired for challenging termination of benefits to his
son). Section 502 provides a cause of action for participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(1982).
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pose risks of insurance claims in the future, few could afford the care they
need, and the many safeguards in ERISA would be vitiated. Employers
could promise benefits without having to worry about delivering on that
promise. As this Article will indicate, benefit costs can be contained in
many ways without creating a group of individuals facing destitution,
unemployability and uninsurability. 30 The purpose of insurance is to
pool risks; some will get sick or injured and others will not. If ERISA is
to mean anything to employees and their families, it must prohibit em-
ployers from reducing insurance costs in ways that defeat this purpose.
A. Employees with Disease or Injury
The most common and notorious form of aggressive cost-cutting is
to terminate employees who become seriously ill or injured.31 Because
most medical plans cover family members, the employer may take similar
action when an employee's family member is afflicted. For illustrative
purposes, this section will examine two situations in which coverage is
often terminated: Cancer and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).
Cancer patients have long experienced difficulty in obtaining and
keeping employment even if they have been free of the disease for many
years. 32 This unfairness is especially serious because cancer occurs fre-
quently-about thirty percent of the population will develop some form
of cancer in their lifetimes. 33 Cancer treatment is often expensive; many
must rely on medical insurance to obtain it.34 Often, the patient will not
be able to work during treatment so that disability benefits are essential
to meeting everyday expenses. If cancer patients lose their jobs and their
benefits, then the public ultimately will bear the costs of treating them
and providing them with shelter and food.35
Employers take action against cancer patients in a variety of ways
and for a variety of reasons. Cancer patients or even healthy employees
found to have a history of cancer may be demoted or fired, transferred to
another job, required to take medical exams even though the reasons are
unrelated to employment, or refused employment. Even if they are
hired, they are often excluded from medical and other benefit pro-
grams. 36 Often the measures are based on misconceptions about cancer.
Many employers believe that a person diagnosed with cancer will die or
become a great financial liability. Coworkers may shun the cancer pa-
30 See, e.g., infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
31 This Article will only discuss injuries and diseases which are not occupationally related. Oc-
cupational diseases and injuries are processed through the workers' compensation system, and that
system is governed by state law, not ERISA.
32 See, e.g., Hoffman, Emploayment Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The .Veed for Federal Legisla-
tion, 59 TEMPLE L.Q., 1, 2-7 (1985); Note, Legal Recourse for the Cancer Patient-Returnee: The Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 10 AM.J.L. MED. 309 (1985).
33 Hoffman, supra note 32, at 2-7.
34 See generally Mamula v. Stralloy, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 563, 577 (S. D. Ohio 1983) (medical insur-
ance is the "passport" to health care in this society).
35 Cancer is a term used to cover a number of diseases, and not all forms of cancer are life-
threatening or debilitating. For example, most forms of skin cancer require little extended treat-
ment if diagnosed early. Hoffman, supra note 32, at 2-6.
36 A .Vew Front in the llWar on Canrer, 64 PERSONNEI.J. 19 (1985).
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tient out of groundless fear of contagion or because the coworker's ill-
ness reminds them of their own mortality.3 7 These concerns are
widespread even though many cancer patients fully recover from the dis-
ease andare not incapacitated or unable to work.38 Nonetheless, many
employers concerned about the cost of the health and disability benefits
and the possibility of absenteeism may establish a policy of discharging
all cancer patients.39 If so, the employee may have a cause of action
under ERISA. As this Article will later indicate, the employee must be
able to show that the adverse decision was made with the intent to de-
prive him or her of benefits. 40 Intent is not always easy to prove.
In recent years, many AIDS patients have been subject to similar, if
not harsher, treatment. Coworkers are often afraid to work with AIDS
patients for fear of contracting the disease. The company and other co-
workers may disapprove of the AIDS patient's actual or presumed sexual
orientation.4 1 The economic reasons for discharge are sobering. At
present, it is estimated that the cost of treatment averages $140,000 per
patient; the disease is usually fatal.42 If the company can discharge an
employee with AIDS, then it may not have to bear these costs. Currently,
there are no estimates of the cost of disability benefits, but these are un-
doubtedly high as well. As with cancer, employees may have a cause of
37 Hoffman, supra note 32, at 4-5; Note, supra note 32, at 310. One study showed that a quarter
of all cancer survivors were fired from their jobs. Hoffman, supra note 32, at 3-4.
38 Cancer andJob Discrimination, 40 TRAINING & DEVELOP.J. I 1-12 (1986);A New Front in the I'aron
Cancer 64 PERSONNELJ. 19-22 (1985).
39 Hoffman, supra note 32, at 3-6. According to Hoffman, cancer survivors, that is those who
have fully recovered from cancer, do noi have any greater absenteeism or death rates significantly
different from those who have not had cancer. Id. at 6.
Because these beliefs are so widespread and because discrimination against cancer survivors is
so pervasive, Representative Biaggi has introduced a bill in Congress. The Cancer Patients Employ-
ment Rights Act of 1985, H.R. 1294, prohibits discrimination on the basis of cancer history. Hoff-
man, supra note 32, at 4-6; supra note 36. As will be discussed later, ERISA does not apply to job
applicants. If an employer refuses to hire someone because they might cost more in insurance bene-
fits, § 510 would not proscribe that conduct. By its terms, § 510 only covers participants and benefi-
ciaries. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. Job applicants do not fall into either category.
However, the employer may be liable under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
(1982), or state handicap laws because cancer or a cancer history is considered a handicap. See 28
C.F.R. § 41.3(b)(1)-(2) (1986); 34 C.F.R. § 104 app. A (1986); Hoffman, supra note 32, at 10-21;
Richards, Handicap Discrimination in Employment: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 39 ARK. L. REV. 1, 5-9
(1985); Note, supra note 32, at 312-20.
40 See infra notes 148-232 and accompanying text.
41 From all available information, AIDS cannot be spread through casual contact. See Aberth,
AIDS in the Workplace, 74 MGMT. REV. 49 (1985); Clark, Cosnell, Witherspoon, Hager & Coppola,
AIDS, NEwswK, Aug. 12, 1985, at 20-47; Engel, AIDS in the Wlorkplace, 228 INDUSTRY WK. 28, 29 (Feb.
3, 1986); AIDS in the Workplace, 64 PERSONNELJ. 20 (1985); Recommendations for Preventhig Transmission
of Ifection with Human T-Lymphotrophic 'irns Type III Lymphadeneparthy-Associated Virus in the Workplace,
34 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682 (Nov. 15, 1985).
At the present time, the disease is concentrated primarily among homosexual men and intrave-
nous drug users. Obviously, these groups have experienced discrimination in the past even before
the AIDS epidemic. The spread of AIDS reinforces existing prejudice. M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL
SCREENING OF WORKERS 72-73 (1984). Because the discrimination against AIDS victims is so in-
tense, some cities have passed legislation prohibiting such discrimination. See. e.g., Los Angeles Mu-
nicipal Code ch. III, art. 5.8 §§ 45.80-.93 (1985); West Hollywood (Calif.) Mun. Code art. 4, ch. 2,
pt. E § 4270 (1985); New York City, Admin. Code, § 8-10811 (1986). See infra notes 52-69 and
accompanying text.
42 Engel, supra note 41, at 30; Halcrow, AIDS in the Workplace, 64 PERSONNE.J. 11 (1985).
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action under ERISA if the employer has discharged them in order to
avoid incurring the insurance claims.
B. Medical and Genetic Testing
Medical advances in recent years have made it possible to detect ge-
netic or other susceptibility for certain diseases through blood and urine
tests.43 For example, blood tests can now determine whether the patient
carries the trait for sickle cell anemia,44 the trait for Tay Sachs disease,45
the genes for Huntington's Disease and cystic fibrosis and many other
hereditary-linked conditions.46 In the near future, tests may also reveal
susceptibility to certain forms of cancer and heart disease.47 Such tests
can aid persons in making lifestyle and procreative choices so as to avert
these risks.48
Problems arise when these tests are used in making employment de-
cisions.49 Much of the scholarly literature has focused on the employer's
uses of such tests to screen out applicants and employees who are at in-
creased risk of injury from exposure to toxic chemicals used in the work-
place.50 Genetic tests, however, can also be used to cut down on
nonoccupational insurance costs. An employee whose tests indicate sus-
ceptibility to catastrophic or chronic diseases could be demoted, trans-
ferred or discharged in order to reduce liability. If such practices go
43 See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 52-80; Appleson, Genes andjobs, 68 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1982);
Brown, Employment Tests: Issues Without Clear Answers, PERSONNEL ADMIN., Sept 1985, at 43; Chapman,
The Ruckus over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 57; Dentzer, Raine, Carroll & Quade, Can
You Pass the Job Test?, NEWSWK, May 5, 1986, at 46 [hereinafter Dentzer]; Diamond, Genetic Testing in
Employment Situations: A Question of Worker Rights, 4J. LEGAL MED. 231 (1983); Englade, Wlho's Hired
and H'ho's Fired, STUDENT LAW., April 1986, at 20; Hamilton & Rhein, The Giant Strides in Spotting
Genetic Disorders Early, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1985, at 82; Kolata, Genetic Screening Raises Questions for
Employers and Insurers, 232 SCIENCE 317 (April 18, 1986); McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employ-
ment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999 (1981); Murray, Genetic Testing at Mork: How Should It be Used?,
PERSONNEL ADMIN., Sept. 1985, at 91; Olian, Genetic Screening for Employment Purposes, 37 PERSONNEL
PSYCH. 423 (1984); Pave, Fear and Loathing in the Workplace: What Managers can do About AIDS, Bus.
WK., Nov. 25, 1985, at 126; Pierce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Wlorkplace-A Legislative Propo-
sal, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 771 (1985); Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Ill-
ness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1983); Sanchez, Genetic Testing: The Genesis of a Ne'w Era in Employee
Protection, I 1 W. ST. U. L. REV. 199 (1984); Schulman, Reading the DNIA Spiralfor Lurking Hereditary
Risks, Bus. WK., Oct. 21, 1985, at 72; Sweltz, Genetic Testing in the TWorkplace: Au Analysis of the Legal
Inplications, 19 FORUM 323 (1983-84).
Much of what is said about medical tests is also applicable to drug testing, but drug testing will
be discussed in the section on unhealthful lifestyles. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
44 M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 73-76; Appleson, supra note 43, at 1061-62; McGarity &
Schroeder, supra note 43, at 1010-11; Murray, supra note 43, at 94; Pierce, supra note 43, at 778;
Rothstein, supra note 43, at 1390; Sanchez, supra note 43, at 200-01.
45 Sweltz, supra note 43, at 327.
46 Hamilton & Rhein, supra note 43, at 82-83; Kolata, supra note 43, at 317; Schulman, supra note
43, at 72.
47 Schulman, supra note 43, at 72. See also AMERICAN MANAGEMENT AssoC., AIDS: THE WORK-
PLACE ISSUES (1985) [hereinafter AMA]; Abert,AIDS in the Workplace, 74 MGMT. REV. 49 (1985);AIDS
is .Vou, Becoiing a Legal Epidemic. Too, INC., Dec. 1985, at 19 [hereinafter 4ids, a Legal Epidemic]; Chap-
man, supra note 43, at 6 1-62; Dentzer, supra note 43, at 47; Halcrow, supra note 42, at 10; Englade,
supra note 43, at 26-27; Hamilton, AIDS Tests that Could Offer ProofPositive, Bus. WK., April 28, 1986,
at 27-28; Pave, supra note 43, at 126.
48 See Sweltz, supra note 43, at 327.
49 See articles cited supra note 43.
50 See, e.g., M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41; Olian, supra note 43; Rothstein, supra note 43.
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unchallenged, they may result in employment only for the fit.5 ' This sec-
tion will discuss two controversial types of medical tests: AIDS antibody
and genetic testing.
As indicated earlier, the spread of AIDS has caused a wave of con-
cern verging on panic. Since 1979, more than twelve thousand people
have died of the disease, more than twenty-five thousand Americans have
contracted it,52 and at least one million others have been exposed to it.53
Thus far, the disease is concentrated primarily among homosexual
males, hemophiliacs, and intravenous drug users. 54 Employers and co-
workers are concerned about the spread of this disease because it is con-
tagious and usually fatal.55 Yet, medical scientists believe AIDS can be
contracted only through intimate contact with infected blood or other
body fluids, not by casual contact such as what would generally occur in
the workplace. 56 Insurance companies and some employers are pressing
to test applicants and employees for the disease or the antibody associ-
ated with exposure to it. One justification for testing is to avoid the high
medical costs associated with the disease. Another is concern over reac-
tion by other employees and customers, some of whom irrationally fear
contagion from a worker who has AIDS. 57
The test for AIDS is actually a test for the antibody to the AIDS
virus, HIV, not a test to determine if the individual suffers from AIDS.
51 Chapman, supra note 43, at 62. See also Schmeck, Advances in Genetic Forecasts Increase Concerns,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1986, at Cl, col. 1-4 & C9, col. 1-4.
52 Boffery, Federal Efforts on AIDS Criticized as Gravely Weak, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 1
& 9, col. 1-2. See also AMA, supra note 47, at 9; Engel, supra note 41, at 28; Pave, supra note 43, at 126.
53 AMA, supra note 47, at 7; Pave, supra note 43, at 126.
54 Mass, Medical Answers About AIDS, in AIDS: THE WORKPLACE ISSUES 58-59 (AMA 1985).
55 Id. at 56.
56 Id. at 58-61, 66, 68-69.
57 Aberth, supra note 4 1, at 50; AIDS, a Legal Epidemic, supra note 47, at 20; Pave, supra note 43, at
126; Skagen & Aberth, Responding to AIDS in the workplace, in AIDS: THE WORKPLACE ISSUES 11-18
(1985).
Another reason for discrimination is prejudice against gay men, the main group who have con-
tracted the disease in the United States. Mass, supra note 54, at 58-61. Other groups such as intrave-
nous drug users or possibly Haitian immigrants are also at greater risk of coming down with the
disease. The employer might overreact and fire anyone in one of the high risk groups even if they
are perfectly healthy. While Haitians would have an action for discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin under Title VII § 703a, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982), federal law does not protect homo-
sexuals from being discharged for sexual orientation. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
Although no federal court has specifically determined whether having AIDS or carrying the
AIDS antibody is a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act, a recent Supreme Court decision, School
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987), held that a person with the contagious
disease of tuberculosis may be handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1127-30. In particu-
lar, the court rejected the Justice Department's position that an employer could discharge an em-
ployee because of an irrational fear of contagion. Id. at 1128-30. However, the court specifically
declined to decide if a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS or if a person with a contagious
disease but with no physical impairment was covered under the Act. Id. at 1128 n.7.
Last year, the Justice Department issued an opinion that discriminating against someone with
AIDS violates the Rehabilitation Act, but employers could fire or refuse to hire an AIDS victim if
they have a real or irrational fear of contagion. Pear, Rights Laws Offer Only Limited ltelp on .lIDS. US.
Rules, N.Y. Times,June 23, 1986. at 1, col. 2 & 13, col. 2-3. This view has been severely criticized by
many commentators. See Pear. States' AIDS Disoimtination Laws Reject justice Departmnent Stand. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A-20, col. 1-3. For a view that AIDS is a handicap, see Leonard. Emplorment
Disoimination .igainst Peisons lith AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 681 (1985); Wilson, From AIDS to 7.: .
Primer for Legal Issues Concerning AIDS, Drugs. and Alcohol in the W11orkplace, 2 LAB. L.%w. 631. 639-40
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Of those exposed to the virus, only between two and twenty percent ac-
tually develop the disease.58 A postitive test result may thus cause hard-
ship for many who are healthy and will never develop the disease.59
Furthermore, the test creates many false positives-persons mistakenly
believed to have been exposed to AIDS.60 Accuracy aside, it is difficult to
see how an employer can justify requiring or using such a test. Protec-
tion of other workers is not a valid reason-as indicated earlier, an em-
ployee with AIDS is unlikely to pass the disease to other employees. 6' Of
course, companies may wish to discharge employees with AIDS simply to
reduce insurance costs. As this Article will show, however, ERISA for-
bids that justification. 62
Like testing for the AIDS antibody, genetic testing is fairly new and
equally controversial. Genetic tests would detect job applicants or em-
ployees more susceptible than others to disease if they were exposed to
certain chemicals. 63 For example, it was believed that persons carrying
the sickle cell trait, detectable through a blood test, could suffer a
sickling crisis if exposed to chemicals which create low oxygen environ-
ments. 64 Later evidence questioned this assumption.65 After adverse
publicity from House hearings66 and an Office of Technology Assess-
ment report,67 most employers who were using genetic screening
(1986); Note, AIDS: Does It Qualify as a "Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 572 (1986).
In addition to a federal cause of action, AIDS victims may also bring an action under state
handicap laws. See Pear, supra, at A-20, col. 1-3; Wilson, supra, at 637-42.
58 Chapman, supra note 43, at 60; Englade, supra note 43, at 26-27; Halcrow, supra note 42, at 11;
Pave, supra note 43. In fact, the test was developed to screen blood donors for the AIDS antibody in
order to reduce the risk of transmitting AIDS through blood transfusions. The test was not designed
to screen people for AIDS. See Mass, supra note 54, at 69-72.
59 See id.
60 Hamilton, AIDS Tests That Could Offer ProofPositive, Bus. WK., April 28, 1986, at 27-28 [herein-
after AIDS Tests]; Pave, supra note 43.
61 See Rothstein, Medical Screening of IIWorkers: Genetics, AIDS, and Beyond, 2 LAB. LAw. 675, 681
(1986); Wilson, supra note 57, at 637.
62 See supra note 5 for the definition of participant and beneficiary. ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1982). Section 502 allows participants and beneficiaries to sue under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
Section 510 does not protect job applicants because by its terms it covers only participants and
beneficiaries. Job applicants have no benefit rights and therefore do not fit into either category.
Because the disease does not spread through casual contact, few large organizations-other
than the U.S. military-have used the AIDS antibody test. Thus far, there are no decisions involving
employees in the private sector who were fired for failing the test. It is unclear if this trend will
continue in the future especially if the disease spreads and medical research develops a more accu-
rate test. SeeAIDS Tests, supra note 60, at 27-28. Some companies are trying to develop an inexpen-
sive test to detect the AIDS virus, not just the antibody. Id.
63 See M. ROTHSTEIN, supa note 41, at 23-27, 52-61; Appleson, supra note 43, at 1061-63; Brown.
supra note 43, at 44-46; Diamond, supra note 43, at 231-34; Englade, snpra note 43, at 27; Kolata,
supra note 43, at 317-19; Murray, supra note 43, at 91-102; Olian, supra note 43, at 423-25; Pierce.
supra note 43, at 77 1-79; Rothstein, supra note 43, at 1384-88; Sanchez, supra note 43, at 199-202:
Sweltz, supra note 43, at 323-32.
64 M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 54-55; Rothstein, supra note 43, at 1384-86; Sanchez, supra
note 43, at 200-01.
65 M. ROTHSTEIN, snpra note 41, at 55; Kolata, supra note 43, at 232; Rothstein, supra note 43, at
1386; Sanchez, supra note 43, at 200-11.
66 Genetic Soreening of Ml'orkeis: Hearing before the Subconmittee of Investigations and Oveisight oft/he Coin-
reittee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1982).
67 OFFICE OF TECIINOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ROLE OF GENEIC TESTING IN THE PREVENTION OF
)CCUIATXrIONAI. DISEASE (1983).
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stopped doing so.6 8 At present, genetic testing is capable of detecting
only a few hundred hereditary conditions with less than perfect accuracy.
However, advances in molecular genetics and genetic engineering are
soon likely to yield more accurate tests about an array of diseases. 69
Does ERISA prohibit the use of such information to screen workers at
risk for diseases? Part III addresses this question. Its resolution will en-
tail important issues of economic and distributive justice.
C. Eliminating Employees with Unhealthful Lifestyles
It is well known that certain unhealthful behavior on the part of a
worker increases the likelihood that he or she, will develop a serious ill-
ness during his or her working life. Rising insurance costs and economic
setbacks have made employers less willing than in the past to absorb the
costs of unhealthful and self-destructive behavior.70 Some have acted
constructively, by, for example, establishing .voluntary wellness and fit-
ness programs for their employees.71 But, some employers are also tak-
ing steps to identify employees with certain lifestyles and punishing those
unwilling to modify their behavior. In some cases, for example obesity
and smoking, identification is easy-the behavior or condition is obvious.
In others, testing or a physical examination may be required. 72 Job ap-
plication forms might also ask about medical conditions. 73 An employer
who is self-insured may find out when it processes medical and disability
claims. As indicated earlier, employers with self-insured plans are likely
to accumulate considerable medical and health data about their employ-
ees and their families. Few state or federal laws prohibit the accumula-
tion of such data.74  Some insurance companies have also urged
employers to distribute health surveys to employees ostensibly to aid em-
68 Englade, supra note 43, at 27; Kolata, supra note 43, at 317-18.
69 Englade, supra note 43, at 27; Kolata, supra note 43, at 317-19; Schulman, supra note 43, at 72;
Schmeck, supra note 51, at Cl & C9; Schmeck, Burst of Discovering Reveals Genetic Basis for Many Diseases,
N.Y. Times, March 31, 1987, at 17, col. 3-5 & 18, col. 1-6; Schmeck, Rapid Advances Point to the
Mapping of all Human Genes, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1986, at C1, col. 1-6 & C3, col. 1-6.
70 This is particularly true of smoking, alcohol and drug abuse. See infra notes 76-98 and accom-
panying text.
71 Executives See Continuing Crisis in Health Care Costs, EMPL. BEN. PLAN REV., Dec. 1985, at 52;
Gibson, Insurers Can Help Set Up Health Risk Assessments, Bus. INS., April 22, 1985, at 16; Harker,
Employers' Response to Runaway Health Care Costs, 9 J. PENSION PLAN. & CoMP. 223, 226-27 (1983);
Walsh, supra note 1, §§ 22-38 to 22-41.
72 See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
73 Rothstein, supra note 43, at 1411-12. See also Gibson, supra note 71, at 16.
74 M. RoTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 90-94. See also Rothstein, snpra note 43, at 1412-13, 1424-96.
Most employees are unaware of the ease with which an employer may have access to their medi-
cal information. Frequently the employee signs a medical information release as part of either the
initial insurance application or a claim application. This release is often vaguely worded to authorize
unrestricted access to the medical records of the employee or claimant. See Winslade, Confidentiality
of Medical Records: An Overview of Concepts and Legal Policies, 3J. LEGAL MED. 497, 506 (1982); Protecting
Y'or Files from Snoopers, CHANGING TIMES, July 1981, at 42. See generally R. SMITH, PRIVACY: How TO
PROTECT WHAT'S LEFT OF IT, 105-19, 132-44 (1979). Such blanket releases have been characterized
as a "search warrant without due process." Linowes, Must Personal Priva
" 
Die in the Computer Age?, 65
A.B.A.J. 1180, 1182 (1979). Signing of such releases has been compared to a contract of adhesion
since the employee or claimant most likely sees the alternative as having to pay his own medical bills.
Solomon, Personal Privay and the "1984" Syndrome, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 753, 770 (1985). An
additional danger of the wholesale release of medical records is that they often contain extraneous
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ployers in setting up wellness programs. 75 This data might also be used
for less beneficial purposes.
1. Smoking
Smoking is the leading cause of preventable disease and premature
death in the United States.76 It costs society between twenty-seven and
sixty-one billion dollars annually. 77 In addition, each smoker costs em-
ployers approximately six hundred and fifty dollars in increased insur-
ance and "clean-up costs." ' 78 Apart from injuring the health of the
smoker, smoking poses health hazards to non-smokers or "passive smok-
ers" who inhale the smoke.79
Thus, more and more employers are restricting or banning smoking
in the workplace. Such restrictions are perfectly legal and contain costs,
information. This may include anecdotal information about such things as the person's emotional
state, financial affairs, sexual preference, and drug or alcohol use. See Winslade, supra, at 504.
Some insurance companies give a price break to employers who process their employees'
claims. Access to Your Medical Records, WORKING WOMAN, June 1984, at 57. Simply processing a bill
from a doctor can reveal significant information just from the doctor's specialty. Id.
Another way in which an employer might gain access to medical information is through an in-
vestigative company. Equifax, an Atlanta based firm, makes preemployment checks and investiga-
tions of persons applying for insurance. Your Medical Records: Not So Private Anymore, CHANGING
TIMES, July 1981, at 41-42. A substantial portion of Equifax's annual business is in the medical
records and information field. Id. Presumably an employer could also hire companies like Equifax
to conduct investigations on current employees.
Some insurance companies have voluntarily established procedures to restrict further disclosure
of claim information unless authorized by the claimant. Podgers, Insurers Do More to Cut Privacy
Abuses: Su ,'v, 67 A.B.A.J. 146 (1981).
In addition, some states have enacted insurance information and privacy protection statutes
consistent with model legislation proposed by the National Association of State Insurance Commis-
sioners. These laws require that release forms be specific as to the type of information to be dis-
closed and have an expiration date. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2106 (Supp. 1986); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 791.06 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-506 (West Supp. 1987); and ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). These states also restrict further disclosure of
information collected by insurance companies: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2133 (Supp. 1986); CAL.
INS. CODE § 791.13 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-513 (West Supp. 1987); and
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.714 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). See also R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 13-17 (1984).
The American Medical Association has also proposed legislation which includes a provision
prohibiting the recipient of medical information from further disclosure without a new authoriza-
tion. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.13 (Deering 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-37.3 to 37.4(e) (Supp. 1985).
75 Gibson, supra note 71, at 16.
76 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HEALTHY PEOPLE-THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION 121 (1979). For example, smoking
can cause lung cancer, other lung disorders, heart disease, and injuries to newborn infants. Roth-
stein, supra note 43, at 1399; Tuofexis,,4 Cloudy Forecast for Smokers, TIME, April 7, 1986, at 45; Smok-
ing on the Job, CONSUMER RESEARCH, Feb. 1986, at 4; ll'hat Are the Hazards of Smoking?, CONSUMER
RESEARCH, April 1984, at 11-14 [hereinafter Hazards of Smoking]. See also Rothstein, Refusing to Employ
Smokerv: Good Public Health or Bad Public Polio'?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940 (1987) Ihereinafter
Refusing to Employ Smokers].
77 Hazards of Smoking, supra note 76, at 14. Raloff, .An Econom"i Case for Banning Smoking. Sci.
NEWS, Jan. 18, 1986, at 40.
78 See Hazards of Smoking, supra note 76, at 11-14; Molotskv, Smokers* Ills Cost Billions. 1.S. Says.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 16. 1985, at A-13. col. 1; Raloff, supra note 77. at 40; Rolland. .1 Burning Issue on the
Job and Off, NEwSwK, Jan. 13, 1984, at 9; Rothstein, supra note 43. at 1399, Walsh, supra note I. at
99 22-38 to 22-40. See also OFFICE OF TFCINOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SMOEINc-REIATED
I)ExrHs AND FINANCIAL Cosrs 3-13, 19-20. § 55 (1985).
79 Molotsky, supra note 78, at A-13. col. 1; Raloff, supra note 77. at 40.
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as well as reduce hazards to other employees.8 Some states have laws
which require them.8 ' The employer might also justify banning or re-
stricting smoking due to loss of productivity.8 2 One major problem is
that smoking is an addiction, not strictly a matter of choice. Accordingly,
some employers have instituted "smoking-cessation classes" and dis-
pensed nicotine chewing gum to reduce withdrawal symptoms. 83 It is
not clear whether smoking caused by nicotine addiction would be found
to be a handicap under handicap discrimination laws. Even if it is, smok-
ing-cessation classes, restricted smoking areas, and distributing nicotine
gum might be considered reasonable accommodations for smoking em-
ployees.8 4 And these measures, even though designed to reduce insur-
ance costs, would not violate section 510 of ERISA because they do not
deprive smokers of medical or other benefits.8 5
But suppose the employer goes further and refuses to hire or fires
anyone who smokes?8 6 Whatever the justification for restricting smoking
on the job, it is difficult to see how an employer could justify this action
against a smoker if he or she is prepared to forego smoking on the job
and the habit does not affect job performance. One rationale might be
that smoking is unhealthful, and the employer should not have to bear
the costs associated with it.87 Refusing employment or threatening to
discharge smokers would, of course, encourage them to stop smoking.
Moreover, even if the employee refrains from smoking on the job, smok-
80 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES CONCERNING
SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE 135-36 (1986); Engel, No Smoking!, INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 11, 1985, at 20-
21; Hubbart, SmokingAt Work-An Emerging Office Issue, ADMIN MGmT., Feb. 1986, at 21-23; Refusing to
Employ Smokers, supra note 76, at 946-50; Cigarette Smoking is a Growing Hazard to Careers in Business, Wall
St.J., April 23, 1987, at 1, Col. 6 and 21, Col. 1-3.
81 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-501.02 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40q
(West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.201-.209 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1580-A (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-40-101 to 40-107 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-5701 to 5713 (1986); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 155:50-:53 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:3D-23-:3D-31 (West 1987); R. I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 23-20.7-1 to 20.7-7 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106 (Supp. 1986); Refusing to Empioy
Smokers, supra note 76, at 946-47; Comment, The Worker's Right to a Smoke-Free Workplace, 9 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 275, 281 n.34 (1984).
82 Raloff, supra note 77, at 40; Rolland, supra note 78, at 9.
83 Rolland, supra note 78, at 9; Walsh, supra note 1, at § 22-39.
84 While courts have found that smoke-sensitivity is a handicap, see, e.g., Vicker v. Veterans Ad-
min., 549 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Tex. 1982), there are no cases which hold that smoking per se is a
handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. It might be possible to argue that smoking is an addiction to
a drug, specifically nicotine. The Rehabilitation Act protects drug addicts if the condition does not
affect job performance. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). It is unclear if courts would be willing to
stretch this provision to cover smokers, nor is it clear that Congress intended to include nicotine
addiction in the Act. Furthermore, smoking also affects the health of other employees who breathe
the smoke.
85 These actions would not violate § 510 as long as these rules arc not set up to eliminate "ex-
pensive" employees who smoke. Would a total ban run afoul of ERISA? Obviously, the employer
can ban smoking where there are flammable chemicals or substances. Such a ban is not likely to
violate ERISA.
86 USG Accoustical Products Company (formerly United States Gypsum) recently established a
policy prohibiting employees from smoking during or outside of work. Smoking is Grounds for Being
Dismissed by Illinois Company, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1986, at 5. Cf .Man qfacturerNow Sa ys Smoking Illon
M1ean Automatic Dismissal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29; 1987, at 1 I.
87 Molotsky, supra note 78, at A-13; Raloff, supra note 77, at 40; Rolland, supra note 78. at 40.
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ers are more likely to cost the employer in time lost and in insurance
claims.
2. Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Employers have many reasons to be concerned over employees'
abuse of alcohol or drugs. The cost of drug and alcohol abuse in em-
ployee theft, lost productivity, accidents, injuries and medical costs has
been conservatively estimated at over sixty billion dollars annually.88 Al-
cohol and drug abuse is a problem for all employers in every sector of
the economy; it occurs among executives, professionals, white and blue
collar workers. 89 Employers have strong economic incentives to identify
and eliminate alcoholics and drug abusers.
Sometimes, the employee's erratic behavior may indicate a drug or
alcohol problem. But other times there may not be any obvious indica-
tion. Accordingly, a growing number of companies are now requiring
employees and job applicants to undergo urine and blood tests to deter-
mine if they abuse alcohol and illegal drugs. Currently, around twenty-
five percent of the Fortune 500 or largest companies screen employees
and job applicants for illegal drugs, 90 and the number is growing. Drug
testing has been severely criticized by civil libertarians and others con-
cerned that the tests used are unreliable and needlessly invade employ-
ees' privacy. 9' Employees in the private sector generally have no
recourse unless there is a statute which prohibits testing; no federal and
few state laws do so. 92
88 Dentzer, supra note 43, at 50; Castro, Battling the Enemy Within: Companies Fight to Drive Illegal
Drugs Out of the Workplace, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 52, 53. Other sources estimate that the cost of
drug abuse alone is at least $25 billion. Belohave & Popp, Enployee Substance Abuse. Epidemic of the
Eighties, Bus. HoRIzoNs, July-Aug. 1983, at 29, 31; Chapman, supra note 43, at 58; Englade, supra
note 43, at 22; Rothstein, Screening J11orkersfor Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framewvork, I 1 EMp. REL. L.J.
422 (1985-86); Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42 (1985).
For example, employees with drinking problems "are responsible for 15 percent of the health
claims paid annually." Belohave & Popp, supra, at 32. Employees who abuse drugs may cost 3 times
more in medical claims than other employees. Englade, supra note 43, at 22.
89 Brown, supra note 43, at 46-50; Castro, supra note 88, at 52-58; Galante, Damage Done by Drug
Abuse Can Cripple Smaller Company, Wall St.J., May 19, 1986, at 45, col. 1; O'Connell, Companies Are
Starting to Sniffout Cocaine Users, Bus. WK., Feb. 18, 1985, at 37; Susser, supra note 88, at 42-43.
90 Castro, supra note 88, at 57. Chapman, supra note 43, at 58; Rothstein, supra note 88, at 423;
Rubin, Defusing A Construction: .Mlanagement and Labor Join to Battle Drug and Alcohol Abuse, ENGINEERING
NEWS-RECORD, Feb. 6, 1986, at 24-25; 1'orker Drug Tests Spread Despite Drug Controversy, MONEY, Oct.
1985, at 13.
Drug abuse has received greater attention than alcohol abuse even though alcohol is the most
abused drug. Rothstein argues that screening programs have concentrated on drugs because drugs
are detectable for significantly longer periods than alcohol, most drug abuse involves illegal drugs
and because there is more of a social stigma attached to drug use. Rothstein, supra note 86, at 423.
Because alcohol testing is less common, most of the discussion will focus on drug testing.
91 Angaroia, Drug Testing in the Il'orkplace: Is It Legal?, PFRSONNEl. ADMIN. Sept. 1985. at 79, 81:
Bishop, inoker Drug Tests Resisted: Court Cases Are 11'atched, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985. at DA, col. 3-5.
DA, col. 1-4; Castro, supra note 86, at 53; Chapman. supra note 43, at 57-58; Englade. supra note 43.
at 20-26; Gampel & Zeese, Are Emplo'ers Overdosing on Drug Testing, Bus. & Soc. REV.. Fall 1985, at 34-
38; Geidt, Drug and.-lcohol Abuse in the Work Place: BalancingEmployer and Employee Rights. I I Elm,. REi..
LJ. 181, 186-90 (1985-86); Lehr & Middlcbrooks, Wl'ork Place Privary Issues and Employer Screenhg Poli-
cies, 11 EMP. RET.. I.J. 407, 411-12 (1985-86) [hereinafter Middlebrooks]; Lindsay, Worker Drug Test
Provoking Debate, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at I col. 3. 32 col. 1-4; Rothstein, supra note 88, at 422-31.
92 See sources cited supra note 91. Only public sector employees can claim that drug and alcohol
testing constitutes an unconstitutional search and seizure under the federal constitution. Because
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However, the unreliability of drug testing has spurred proposed leg-
islation which would limit the use of such tests to jobs in which alertness
is essential to public safety.93 The proponents of such legislation point
out that the tests produce many false positives; for cocaine the figure is
about twenty-five percent. False positives can occur because the person
has taken cold medicines or cough syrup 94 Because accurate tests often
cost ten or twenty times more to conduct, few employers conduct back
up tests to confirm positive test results. 95 Moreover, the tests do not
distinguish between habitual and occasional users. 96 The drug may show
up in the tests days or even weeks after use.
3. Obesity
People who are overweight or who eat improperly bear a greater risk
of heart disease, cancer, diabetes, high blood pressure and other diseases
than persons of normal weight.97 Obesity is often but not invariably
caused by poor eating habits.98 People who are seriously or significantly
overweight often experience various kinds of discrimination in the work-
place, though not always for health-related reasons. Overweight people
are often victimized by stereotypes that they are unhealthy, lazy, undis-
ciplined, and sloppy.99 Even if the job applicant or employee can show
that obesity is due to a medical condition, the employer may be unwilling
to bear the cost of treating it.100
there is no state action, private sector employees cannot make this claim. Rothstein, supra note 88, at
433. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D.C. Iowa 1985) (policy requiring correc-
tional employees to give blood and urine samples on management's demand an unreasonable search
and seizure), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing strip search on objective crite-
ria and allowing urinalysis test where uniform, systematic random selection or based on reasonable
suspicion). See also SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCES part II, ch. VIII, art. 33A (1985) (ordinance
prohibits drug testing except where employee shows signs of impairment and impairment presents
danger to others).
93 Thus far, only San Francisco has passed such an ordinance. See supra note 92. See generally
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ALCOHOL & DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS AND
CONTROVERSIES 59-69, 73-75 (1986).
94 Dentzer, supra note 43, at 50; Englade, supra note 43, at 53; Gampel & Zeese, supra note 91, at
34-35; Rothstein, supra note 88, at 426-27. Even over-the-counter drugs such as Contact, Sudafed
and aspirin will register as illegal drugs with some of the tests. Wilson, supra note 57, at 659. Ac-
cording to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), a recent study made in 1985 reported "error rates
as high as 69 percent in labs performing the EMIT tests," the main test used for most drug testing.
Wilson, supra note 57, at 659; Corporate Iorld Takes to Drug Tests, Los Angeles Times,July 27, 1985, at
1 (Part 1).
The other reason for inaccurate results is carelessness in the testing procedures. Many of the
tests are conducted at the workplace, not a laboratory. Furthermore, the tests are not always con-
ducted by qualified laboratory technicians. Samples may become contaminated or the tests may not
be conducted properly in other respects. See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 426-27.
95 See Chapman, supra note 43, at 60; Englade, supra note 43, at 53. The two major tests in use,
the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) and Radioimmunoassay (RIA), do not mea-
sure the concentration of drugs but rather the effect of the drug on certain enzymes. Rothstein,
supra note 88, at 426-27.
96 See Dentzer, supra note 43, at 50; Englade, supra note 43, at 23-24; Gampel & Zeese, supra note
91, at 36-38.
97 Kolata, Obesity Declared a Disease, 227 SCIENCE 1019-20 (1985); Rothstein, supra note 43, at
1398-99; Comment, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection for Victims of ll'eight Discrimination?, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 947, 948-50 (1982).
98 Comment, supra note 97, at 948-50.
99 Id. at 951-55.
100 As this Article will later indicate, if the employee would show that he or she was fired for this
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D. Absenteeism and Leave Policies
Thus far, this Article has described several ways employers can
directly identify and target employees who are or are likely to become
medical risks. There are also indirect ways. Instead of excluding such
employees directly the employer might adopt absenteeism rules under
which employees are discharged if they accumulate a certain number of
absences from work for medical reasons. The employer might justify
such a policy as necessary to eliminate malingerers-employees who con-
tinually miss work for no good reason.
Absentee policies can take a number of forms. First, some employ-
ers only excuse absences if the employee's illness falls under an approved
list. Then if the employee misses too much work because of an illness or
an injury not contained in the list, he or she can be terminated. While
the employer is likely to excuse absences for serious illnesses such as
cancer, absences due to recurring medical problems such as back pain or
migraine headaches might not be recognized even if the employee could
produce a doctor's note or certificate that the condition was genuine.' 0 '
Other employers limit even the number of excused absences so that
a victim of heart disease or cancer could be terminated before becoming
eligible for disability benefits or leave. Most disability benefit plans con-
dition eligibility on length of service and duration of the illness. 10 2 If
employers can discharge employees before they become eligible for disa-
bility benefits, employers can avoid these costs. 0 3
Another group of employers refuse to excuse absences for medical
conditions which developed prior to employment. 0 4 Similarly, the em-
ployer might limit sick leave in ways similar to absences from work-by
permitting employees to take sick leave only if their illness or injuries are
on an approved list or their condition developed after employment. 10 5
The employer might also severely limit the number of days off and, per-
haps, provide no sickness and accident insurance policy to cover the em-
ployee before he or she would be eligible for long term disability
benefits.
If employees are terminated because of restrictive absentee and sick
leave policies, can they challenge these practices under ERISA? As will
be discussed more fully later, one immediate difficulty is that the perti-
nent statutory provision requires intent-plaintiffs must show that the
reason, then the employee could bring an action under § 510. See infra notes 199-211 and accompa-
nying text. Apparently, only Michigan specifically prohibits discrimination against overweight peo-
ple. See Reaves, Fat Folks' Rights, 69 A.B.A. J. 878 (1983). Few cases have succeeded under state
laws. But see McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 480 N.E.2d 695, 491 N.Y.S. 2d 106 (1985)
(obesity is a handicap under New York disability statute), limited in Application of State Div. of
Human Rights on Complaint of Granville, 504 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1986).
101 See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 578-81 (4th ed. 1985).
102 See supra earlier discussion of disability benefits at notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
103 Id.
104 Some employers do exclude these illnesses as a qualification for sick leave. For example, the
collective bargaining agreement for the Regional Transportation District and the Amalgamated
Transit Union excludes sick pay benefits for "any chronic ailment existing before entering the em-
ploy of the Employer." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 62:905
(1985). Such a clause could also be included in the policy on absenteeism.
105 See supra note 104.
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employer's policy is aimed at depriving employees of benefits. Here the
employer would argue that the intention is not deprivation of benefits
but deterrence of excess absenteeism, a legitimate concern. 06 Yet there
are ways of promoting that interest-such as by requiring a doctor's cer-
tificate or a physical exam to show that the medical condition is genu-
ine' 07-that do not deprive employees of benefits when they need them.
Part III offers an analysis of section 510 cases which suggest that these
means may be statutorily mandated.
III. Interfering with Insurance Benefits Under ERISA
While section 510 of ERISA is not a broad antidiscrimination statute
such as ADEA, Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act,' 08 this provision can
protect employees and family members identified as medical risks from
losing their insurance benefits. Section 510 makes it unlawful:
for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or dis-
criminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right
to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan, [or] this title .... or for the purpose of interfering with the attain-
ment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under
the plan, [or this title] .... It shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel or discriminate against any person be-
cause he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in
any inquiry or proceeding relating to this [Act] .... The provisions of
section 1132 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.' 0 9
Section 510 prohibits two types of acts. First, the employer or any
party cannot discharge or in any other way discriminate against partici-
pants and beneficiaries who exercise their rights under a benefit plan or
the Act. This antiretaliation provision is similar to those found in other
federal labor statutes.1 0 Thus, if an employee or a member of his or her
family files a medical claim or brings a court action over loss of benefits
and the employer responds by discharging the employee he or she may
sue under section 510.111 As indicated earlier, this provision is essential
to protect the integrity of the statutory scheme for medical and disability
benefits. 112
A second part of section 510, which is unique to ERISA and has far
broader application than the first, prohibits interference "with the attain-
106 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 101, at 578-8 1.
107 Id.
108 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) [hereinafter ADEA];
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17; Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-796.
109 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). ERISA § 511, 29 U.S.C. § 1141, makes it a criminal offense to use
fraud, force, or violence in order to interfere with a participant's and beneficiary's rights under the
Act or a benefit plan. However, this statute does not create a private cause of action. See West v.
Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
110 See, e.g., § 4(d) of ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1982); § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) and (3).
111 But see Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984) (employees did not
state a cause of action under § 510 if discharged for bringing state law actions against employer).
112 See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
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ment of any right to which such participant may become entitled."" l3
Like the prohibition against firing workers for filing claims, this provision
is essential to make ERISA effective. It would be meaningless to require,
for example, that a pension vest after ten years if the employer could
simply fire employees just before the allotted time expires." 14 Therefore,
section 510 prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise dis-
criminating against an employee simply because he or she poses a risk of
high insurance costs. But, because employees usually lose their benefits
after they are discharged regardless of the reason for the discharge, the
decisions uniformly require employees to show that their employer dis-
charged them in order to deprive them of benefits. This may be difficult
to prove, especially if the employer can present independent reasons for
the action.115
To analyze section 510, this part will first examine what parties are
covered by it, who can bring an action and then whether plaintiffs must
exhaust the plan's claim procedures before bringing an action in federal
court. The last subsection will analyze the case law with regard to section
510 and its deficiencies. To remedy these deficiencies, this Article pro-
poses applying, with modifications, case law under Title VII and the
NLRA to claims brought under section 510.
A. Parties Covered by Section 510
Section 510 applies only to participants and beneficiaries-individu-
als who have or will have rights to employee benefits. 16 It covers all
employees who are or will be eligible for benefits but not job applicants
or employees who do not have any prospect of receiving benefits. 1 7 If
the employer chooses not to hire someone because of expected benefit
costs, ERISA provides no relief-although other antidiscrimination laws
might.1 8 Moreover, employees who have no benefits cannot bring an
action under ERISA. ERISA does not require the employer to provide
any benefits." 19
A "beneficiary" under ERISA is defined as anyone "designated by a
participant," or who is or may be entitled to receive benefits under the
113 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
114 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history.
115 See, e.g., Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (no cause of
action under § 510 where loss of benefits a mere consequence of rather than a motivating factor
behind termination).
116 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). ERISA defines a plan participant as an "employee or former em-
ployee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit ... from an employee benefit plan."
ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).
117 On the other hand, § 510 does cover probationary employees who may not, as yet, have ac-
quired any right to benefits under the terms of a benefit plan. See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701
F.2d 1238, 1241-43 (7th Cir. 1983). If the employer hired and regularly fired new or probationary
employees before they became eligible for benefits, these employees could have an action under
ERISA. As indicated earlier, Congress was especially concerned that employers would fire employ-
ees before their pension benefits vested. For that reason, § 510 specifically covers employees who
will be eligible for benefits in the future. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
118 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796.
119 See Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1980) (ERISA only provides mini-
mum requirements if employer chooses to provide employee benefits).
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terms of the benefit plan. 120 The beneficiary is typically a member of the
employee's immediate family such as a spouse or child. If any action is
taken against the employee and his or her family in order to interfere
with their benefits then ERISA provides a cause of action.
Although ERISA restricts who may sue, section 510 contains a broad
definition of who can be a defendant. Section 510 provides that it is
unlawful for "any person" to interfere with a participant or beneficiary's
benefit rights.12 ' In practical terms, the defendant will usually be the
employer.' 22 In most of the cases that have been brought, the employer
has been charged with discharging the employee to deprive him or her of
benefits. 123 Although jointly administered trusts or plans may be sued
under section 510, they rarely have the power or incentive to discharge
workers for health risks. 124
B. Exhaustion of Claims Procedures
The case law is divided on whether participants and beneficiaries
must exhaust the benefit claims procedures before bringing a section 510
action.' 25 Neither section 510 nor its civil enforcement provision, sec-
tion 502, contains any exhaustion requirement.' 26 However, section 503
requires all welfare and pension plans to have appeal and claims proce-
dures. 12 7 Courts have inferred that Congress intended that claimants ex-
haust those procedures before going to court.' 28 However, plan claim
procedures are generally designed to interpret the terms of a plan or to
review the fairness of an administrator's denial of benefits. 129 Section
510 claims, by contrast, concern discrimination or improper motive. The
focus is on the underlying reasons for the employer's action, not the
terms of the benefit plan. Therefore, the claims procedures are not
120 ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982). ERISA is the only federal antidiscrimination pro-
vision which covers someone other than an employee or job applicant. In covering beneficiaries, the
coverage of ERISA is broader than -other antidiscrimination statutes. However, ERISA is also nar-
rower than other statutes because § 510 does not cover job applicants or employees who are not
covered by any benefit plan.
121 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
122 See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of plan organization or adminis-
tration. As indicated, most benefit plans are administered by the employer in both union and non-
union settings.
123 See cases cited supra note 6.
124 See cases cited supra note 19.
125 The following cases have required employees to exhaust the claims procedures before bring-
ing an action: Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11 th Cir. 1985); Kross v. Western
Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983); Mann v. Meatcutters Local 227, 4 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2659 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
These cases have not required exhaustion: Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d
Cir. 1987); Zipf v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986); Burke v. Latrobe Steel
Co., 775 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1985); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984);
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.NJ. 1985).
126 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
127 Id. § 1133.
128 See, e.g., Kross, 701 F.2d at 1244-45; Challengers v. Local I Ironworkers, 619 F.2d 645 (7th
Cir. 1980); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Bakery and Confec-
tionary Union Welfare Fund, 455 F. Supp. 816 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
129 See ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982). See also Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d
834 (3d Cir. 1987); Zipf, 799 F.2d 889; Burke, 775 F.2d at 90; Amaro, 724 F.2d at 749-52; VcLendon,
602 F. Supp. at 1501; Gavalik, 3 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1311.
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designed to hear this kind of claim.'10
With collective bargaining, the situation may be different. Most col-
lective bargaining agreements provide that a union employee cannot be
discharged or disciplined except for 'just cause."' 3 1 At the same time,
collectively bargained plans typically have separate administrative appeal
procedures which coexist with the workplace grievance and arbitration
system.' 3 2 Although this claims procedure cannot address the section
510 claim for the above reason, it is often possible for the union to bring
a claim for wrongful discharge and discipline to arbitration. 133 Even
though the claim is arbitrable, some courts have not required union em-
ployees to arbitrate the claim nor precluded them from bringing an ac-
tion in court if they arbitrate the claim first.' 3 4 The overlap between
arbitrable and statutory claims has existed in Title VII and other federal
labor laws. With Title VII, for example, courts do not require exhaustion
because a Title VII claim is an independent statutory claim.' 35 Arbitra-
tion is aimed at resolving questions regarding the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, not claims under federal law. Courts
disagree as to whether section 510, as an independent statutory claim,
should be treated the same way as Title VII.
In Kross v. Western Electric Co. ,136 the plaintiff maintained that he was
discharged because the employer no longer wanted to pay for his medi-
cal and life insurance benefits and because the employee's pension would
have vested in two years.' 37 The plaintiff did not exhaust the benefit
plan's administrative procedures before bringing the court action. The
Seventh Circuit found that exhaustion of the administrative appeal pro-
cedures was required before bringing an action under section 510.138
The court stated that requiring exhaustion furthered the private resolu-
tion of ERISA-related disputes, reduced the number of frivolous law-
suits, reduced the cost of legitimate disputes, and helped develop
procedures mandated by the Act. 139 The court found that requiring ex-
haustion furthered these goals even though the procedures could only
interpret the terms of the benefit plan and even though the court recog-
130 See,,maro, 724 F.2d at 751-52; Kross, 701 F.2d at 1245-46. In fact, the claims' procedures will
often indicate that such claims cannot be processed. Section 510 claims are statutory rather than
contractual claims, and courts do not require exhaustion of statutory claims. See Barrentine v. Ar-
kansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (employees who lose in arbitration can bring Fair
Labor Standard action in court); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (as in-
dependent statutory claims, Title VII claims need not go through arbitration, nor would adverse
arbitral decisions preclude court action).
131 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 101, at 651-54.
132 Interview with Karin Feldman, Assistant General Counsel, United Steelworkers of America,
Pittsburgh, Pa. (Dec. 8, 1986). If the benefits are administered by ajointly administered trust fund,
then the claims procedures are separate from the other arbitration system. See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(b) (1986).
133 That is, if the union chooses to do so. That is one of the flaws in the arbitral system. See
.kcLendoni, 602 F. Supp. at 1501-06.
134 See cases cited supra note 129.
135 Alexander, 415 U.S. 36. See also Barrenine, 450 U.S. 728.
136 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983).
137 Id. at 1241-42.
138 Id. at 1246.
139 Id. at 1244-45 (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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nized that a section 510 claim was a statutory and not a contractual
claim. 140
Kross is questionable-courts have never required exhaustion for
other statutory claims under ERISA, such as claims alleging fiduciary vio-
lations.14' Also, it is difficult to see how exhaustion can further the goal
of private resolution of disputes if private procedures cannot address the
claim. Exhaustion requires plaintiffs to engage in a futile act. Therefore,
the better view is not to require exhaustion. In Amaro v. Continental Can
Co. ,142 plaintiffs charged that the employer laid them off to prevent them
from obtaining the service time required to qualify for their shutdown
pension benefits. 143 The union submitted one of the grievances to arbi-
tration and lost. The second grievance was not arbitrated. The Ninth
Circuit found that the adverse arbitration decision did not preclude an
action under ERISA because the section 510 claim was a statutory and
not a contractual claim and a statutory right is "independent of any col-
lectively bargained rights."' 144 The court's reasoning seems correct.
Arbitrators rarely consider statutory claims,' 45 and thus seldom develop
expertise in interpreting federal statutes or sensitivity to matters of fed-
eral policy.1 46 If arbitration procedures cannot effectively protect indi-
vidual claims, then the nonunion claims procedures discussed earlier are
even more ineffective.147
C. Adopting Federal Antidiscrimination Law to Section 510
Section 510 merely declares impermissible certain actions on the
employer's part. Neither it nor the case law provides needed guidance in
analyzing claims and allocating burdens of proof. Most of the cases
either do not specify what the plaintiff must do to establish discrimina-
tory motive or require plaintiffs to prove not only discriminatory motive
but also that the adverse decision would not have occurred in the ab-
sence of such a motive, a much higher burden than is generally required
under other antidiscrimination laws. 148 Given the inadequacy of the case
140 Id. at 1243-46.
141 See, e.g., DeIgrosso v. Spang and Co., 586 F. Supp. 177, 179-82 (W.D. Pa. 1983), rev'don other
grounds, 769 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1985).
142 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
143 Id. at 748-49.
144 Id. at 749-53. See also cases cited supra note 129.
145 Aniaro, 724 F.2d at 750.
146 See Zipf, 799 F.2d at 893.
147 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
148 The following cases simply state that the plaintiff must show discriminatory motive: Crouch v.
Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1984); Aronson v. Servus Rubber, 730
F.2d 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984); Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, 680 F.2d
911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980); Quat-
trochi v. Allied Chem. Corp., 633 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Barnes v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
631 F. Supp. 248 (D. Minn. 1986); Corum v. Farm Credit Servs., 628 F. Supp. 707 (D. Minn. 1986);
Lackus v. Acme Mkts., No. 85-1341 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Hamann v. International Harvester Co., No. 84-C-10552 (N.D. I11. Oct. 31, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Inglis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 85-1344 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1985) (LEXIS,
Gcnfed library, Dist file); Beckwith v. International Mill Servs., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Shipper v.
Avon Prods., 605 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ferguson v. Freedom Forge Corp., 604 F. Supp.
1157 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Wilke v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 84 C 1352 (N.D. Il1. June 26, 1984)
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law, it is necessary to look to and adapt the analysis in other federal dis-
crimination law to section 510 claims. In particular, the case law under
the retaliation provision of Title VII, ADEA and the NLRA is most rele-
vant. 149 Section 5 10's legislative history indicates that it was modeled on
other federal labor law provisions, particularly with respect to antiretalia-
tion provisions. 150
Commentators have long understood that proving discriminatory
motive can be difficult in employment discrimination actions.' 5 ' Em-
ployers rarely admit that they are taking actions for prohibited reasons;
plaintiffs generally must prove their case with circumstantial evidence.1 52
Therefore, the allocation of the burden of persuasion is crucial.1 53 In
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Goins v. Teamsters Local 639 Health and Pension Trust, 598 F.
Supp. 1151 (D.D.C. 1984); Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp.
740 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Watkinson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 585 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Watson v. Fuller Brush Co., 570 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Titsch v. Reliance Group, 548 F.
Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983); Silverman v. Wilmit, No. 79
Civ. 6736 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); McGinnis v. Joyce, 507 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Turner v. CF&I Corp., 510 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Baeten v. Van
Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Wis. 1979). But see Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., Nos. 81-15190 and
82-1995 slip op. (W.D. Pa., Sept. 24, 1985) (Defendant was not liable even though plaintiffs proved
that the layoff policy was designed to reduce benefit costs. The plaintiff was not able to show that the
layoff would not have occurred for other reasons). For a critique of Gavalik, see infra notes 178-203,
210 and accompanying text.
149 Title VII § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982); ADEA § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); NLRA
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Because the statutory language in Title VII and ADEA is identical,
the two statutes will be discussed together.
150 [S]ection 610 of § 4 as originally reported-made it illegal to 'discharge, fine, suspend,
expell [sic], discipline or discriminate' against plan participants to defeat rights under the
act or a plan. The language parallels section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
and should do the trick-but only if an adequate enforcement machinery exists.
Speech by Senator Hartke; 119 CONG. REC. 30,374, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISToRY at 1774-75. See
also West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 108-12 & 145 and accompanying text. Compare ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1982) with Title VII § 704a, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; ADEA § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); NLRA § 8(a)(3),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
151 See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 557-62, 1286-324 (2d
ed. 1983) and 107-09, 242-54 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter SCHLEI & GROSSMAN and SCHLEI & GROSS-
MAN SuPP.]; C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARD, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION § 1.4 (1980) [hereinafter SULLIVAN & ZIMMER]; Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Mlotive Title 1II Action: A Sound Polio' Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
292, 292-94, 321-22 (1982); DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases, 66 GEO. LJ.
1109 (1978); Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32
STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1130-31, 1159-61 (1980).
See also Bellace, Comparable Worth: Proving Sex-Based Jl'age Discrimination, 69 IOwA L. REV. 655
(1984); Denis, How to Identify Employment Discrimination Retaliation Claims, 66 CHI. B. REC. 168 (1984);
Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The Significance of Aonstatistical Evidence in
Disparate Impact Cases under Title VII, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1; Player, The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's
Burden in Title 1I Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REV. 17 (1984); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination
.Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity ll'ithout Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984); Zimmer & Sullivan, The Structure of Title I'I
Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Disoimination.
and Burdens of Proof, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25 (1986); Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Dis-
charge in Title I'll Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (1986); Note, Disparate Inpact Analysis and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038 (1984); Comment, Bazemore v. Friday: Salary
Discrimination (uder Title I, 99 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1986); Recent Developments, Labor Law-Em-
ployer l'iolates Section 8(a)(3) of NLRA i Emplo yee Would Not Hale Been Discharged But for Union Acthiti-
Burden of Persuasion Remains with Employee, 28 VI.L. L. REV. 470 (1982-83).
152 See SCIILEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 15; Mendez, supra note 151, at 1130.
153 Mendez, supra note 151, at 1130.
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addition, as with many discrimination suits, proof of wrongful motive
may be complicated under section 510 because decisions taking away
medical and disability benefits may be made for both illegal and legiti-
mate reasons. The question then becomes how much of the adverse ac-
tion must be made for illegal reasons before a court will find the
employer liable.' 54 Finally, once the plaintiff establishes an illegal motive
on the employer's part, it is uncertain what he or she can recover if the
action was "independently justified on legitimate grounds"-that is,
would the employee have been terminated anyway?' 55 As will be noted,
federal discrimination case law on all these issues is unclear.' 56
This section will propose apportioning the burden of proof in the
following manner: The plaintiff must prove that interference with ex-
isting or future rights under an employee benefit plan was a substantial
or motivating factor behind the adverse employment action.1 57 The par-
ticular elements of the plaintiff's case will vary depending on whether the
action was an individual claim or a "pattern and practice" class action. 158
If the plaintiff is able to make this showing, he or she will have success-
fully established the defendant's liability. The defendant would then be
given the opportunity of showing that he or she would have made the
same decision on independent, legitimate grounds. Such a showing
would generally limit plaintiffs to prospective relief and attorney's fees.
The employer would ordinarily not be required to reinstate plaintiffs or
to provide back and front pay or the value of lost benefits. As will be
indicated, finding liability after plaintiffs establish that interference with
benefit rights was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate fully
vindicates the purpose of section 510-protects benefits while not re-
quiring reinstatement or other damages when the employer can demon-
strate the termination would nevertheless have occurred for legitimate
reasons.' 59 If the defendant cannot show that he or she would have
made the same decision on legitimate grounds, the full range of legal and
equitable remedies would be available.
1. Individual Claims
Section 510 does not specify the elements of plaintiff's case. Analo-
gizing from retaliation cases under Title VII, plaintiffs should be re-
quired to show: (1) that the employer knew that the plaintiff was or was
likely to become a medical risk; (2) that adverse employment action was
taken against the plaintiff; and (3) that the adverse action was taken, in
154 Brodin, supra note 151, at 293.
155 Id.
156 See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 560-62; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN Supp., supra note 151,
at 109; Brodin, supra note 151, at 293, 299-304.
157 This analysis is similar to the same decision test in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See infa notes 178-98.
158 A pattern and practice case exists where plaintiffs claim that the discriminatory treatment was
not simply an isolated, discrete act but rather a policy directed at a particular class of individuals.
Pattern and practice cases have been brought under Title VII. See Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 325 (1977); SCHt.Et & GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 13-15, 1233-24; ScH.EI & GROSSMAN
Stupp., supra note 151, at 253-54.
159 See infra notes 177-90.
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substantial part, to interfere with the plaintiff's rights under a health and
welfare benefit plan.1 60 The specification of elements is tailored to the
health and disability insurance issues raised earlier. 16 1 Courts could eas-
ily adapt this analysis to fit pensions or other claims under section 510.
Once the plaintiff has established that an illicit motive was a substantial
reason for the employment action, then the plaintiff has established the
employer's liability.
To establish that the employer interfered with his or her right to
receive medical and disability benefits, the plaintiff must show that the
employer was aware that the employee or a member of the employee's
family was a medical risk. This may be done by showing that the em-
ployee or someone else told the employer about the condition. 62 The
condition may be self-evident, or the employer may know about it from a
physical examination, one of the medical tests described earlier, 163 or a
health form. 164 Finally, the employer may have medical information if it
is self-insured and processes and pays medical and disability insurance
claims routinely. 65 It should not matter that the employer's perception
is mistaken-based on rumor or inaccurate tests. If the employer regards
the employee as a medical risk, even mistakenly, that should meet the
"knowledge" requirement. 66
The plaintiff ordinarily has little difficulty establishing the second
element of the case-that he or she suffered some adverse employment
action. Benefits are tied to employment, and employees usually lose
them if discharged or drastically demoted. Section 510 specifically pro-
hibits the employer from discharging, firing, suspending, expelling, disci-
plining or discriminating against employees. 167 While this list is fairly
comprehensive, the case law indicates that it is not exclusive. Other ac-
tions, such as forcing an employee to quit or constructive discharge have
also been found to violate this provision.' 68
Of all the requirements, the most difficult is establishing a causal
connection between the medical risk, the loss of benefits and the adverse
action. Many section 510 claims fail because the plaintiff cannot marshal
160 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN Supp., supra note 151, at 107-08. See, e.g., McKenna v. Weinberger, 729
F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Canino V. United States E.E.O.C., 707 F.2d 468, 471 (11 th Cir.
1983); Deanda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1982); Lamb v. Rantoul, 538 F. Supp. 34
(D.R.I. 1981); Kellin v. ACF Indus., 517 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d 279 (8th Cir.
1982).
161 See supra notes 29-107 and accompanying text.
162 See Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (plaintiff told employer he had
multiple sclerosis two months before he was fired).
163 See supra notes 43-69 and accompanying text for the discussion of medical and genetic testing.
164 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
165 For a discussion of insurance plan funding and administration, see supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
166 This analysis is similar to the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982), where
a person is handicapped if they are "regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
167 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
168 See Crouch v. Mo-Kan Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff
entitled to relief under § 510 when defendant made plaintiff's working condition intolerable and
forced her to quit because she claimed pension benefits); Corkery v. Super Drugs Corp., 602 F.
Supp. 42 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (hostile working conditions forced plaintiff to take early retirement).
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enough circumstantial evidence to establish this connection. 69
One crucial factor in proving motive is the timing of the action. The
inference of discriminatory motive is strong if the employer takes action
close to the time when it discovers the medical condition or risk. Con-
versely, the longer the delay, the weaker the inference unless, perhaps,
the condition worsens.1 70 For example, in Folz v. Marriott Corp. the em-
ployer fired the plaintiff, an eighteen-year employee, only two months
after the plaintiff informed the employer that he had multiple sclero-
sis. 17 1 The timing of the discharge, along with other evidence, created a
strong inference of discriminatory motive. 172
Another indication of motive is a change in the way the employer
treats the employee after the employer learns of the employee's condi-
tion. The inference strengthens if the employer has previously fired or
disciplined other individuals who posed medical risks or if the employer
deviates from its own self-prescribed disciplinary procedures. In Foltz,
the plaintiff was placed on probation allegedly for poor performance but
did not receive the progressive discipline as required in the company's
personnel manuals. Failure to follow these procedures and the harsh-
ness of plaintiff's treatment also created the suspicion that the discharge
was for illegal reasons. 173 Similarly, in Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 174 the em-
ployer fired the plaintiff, a thirty year employee, just before he became
eligible for a disability pension because he allegedly borrowed tools from
the workplace without permission. Other employees had regularly bor-
rowed tools from the mine under similar circumstances without being
disciplined or fired.175
Apart from the timing of the action or differential treatment, the
causal connection might also be established by showing that the em-
ployer had a strong economic incentive to deprive the plaintiff of bene-
fits. This particular factor must, of course, be applied cautiously. For
example, whenever an employee loses his or her job, the employer saves
money-it no longer has to provide welfare benefits to that person. But,
not all discharges are impermissible simply for this reason. This factor
could be significant if combined with other circumstantial evidence, such
as in Folz, where the employer's health and welfare plans were self-
funded. The court found that because the employer paid the medical
and disability claims directly out of company funds, there was a strong
economic incentive to discharge anyone suffering from a progressive and
potentially catastrophic disease such as multiple sclerosis.' 76 Together
169 See, e.g., Beckwith v. International Mill Servs., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Baker v.
Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Shipper v. Avon Prods.,
Inc., 605 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. N.Y. 1985); Ferguson v. Freedom Forge Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D.
Pa. 1985); Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). See also cases cited
supra note 148.
170 See Sci.xi & GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 559.
171 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1011-13 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
172 Id. at 1014-15. See also SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 558-59.
173 594 F. Supp. at 1014.
174 556 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. Pa. 1983), affyd ii pertient pad, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983).
175 Id. at 573-74.
176 Fol:, 594 F. Supp. at 1014-15.
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with the timing and differential treatment, this evidence strengthened the
finding of discriminatory motive. Similarly in Ursic, the plaintiff would
have been the youngest employee to retire with a disability pension. The
employer manifested its displeasure with the plaintiff's decision to retire
and fired him shortly thereafter.' 77
After the plaintiff establishes all the elements of its case for the em-
ployer's liability under section 510, the employer will be given the oppor-
tunity to rebut the plaintiff's case by showing that it acted for legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. To escape liability entirely the employer
must establish the discriminatory motive played no significant part in the
adverse employment decision. Under the better approach, the employer
would not escape liability merely by showing that the same decision
would have been made had its motives been pure. Rather this "same
decision" argument would only bear on the extent of the remedy to be
afforded.
This approach, advocated by one commentator and applied in cer-
tain discrimination cases,' 78 goes beyond the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in the well-known decision, Mt. Healthy City School Board of
Education v. Doyle. 179 In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court allocated the
burdens of proof as follows. The plaintiff has the initial burden of show-
ing that the constitutional violation played a motivating or substantial
factor in the employment decision. Once the plaintiff makes this show-
ing, the burden then shifts to the employer to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it would have reached the "same decision" even
in the absence of the protected conduct.180 Although it is not clear from
the decision whether the "same decision" test applies to the determina-
tion of liability or only to the issue of the appropriate remedy,18' the
application of the Mt. Healthy test to anti-union discrimination cases
177 Ursic, 556 F. Supp. at 573-74.
178 Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (the same decision test applies only in
determining the remedy); Brodin, supra note 15 1. The same decision test was originally articulated
by the Supreme Court in a first amendment case, Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977). See itifra note 191.
There is some support for the approach I advocate in one § 510 case. Although Zipf v. Ameri-
can Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986), holds that plaintiff need not exhaust claims
procedures before bringing an action, the Third Circuit, in dicta, stated that the plaintiff need not
satisfy a "but for" standard like that in Mt. Healthy.
Section 510 itself indicates that the employee need not show that "but for" the unlawful
interference, the employee would have been entitled to benefits. The statutory language
forbids conduct taken for "the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to
which such participant may become entitled," regardless of whether the interference is suc-
cessful and regardless of whether the participant would actually have received the benefits
absent the interference. Thus Section 510 does not require Zipf to demonstrate that she
would have been entitled to benefits on April 6. or at any other specific time.
799 F.2d at 893.
179 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
180 Id. at 287.
181 The following passage indicates the ambiguity in the decision:
One plausible meaning of the [district] court's statement is that the Board and the Superin-
tendent not only could, but in fact would have reached that decision had not the constitu-
tionally protected incident of the telephone call to the radio station occurred. We are thus
brought to the issue whether, even if that were the case. the fact that the protected conduct
played a "substantial part" in the actual decision not to renew would necessarily amount to
a constitutional violation justifying remedial action. We think that it would not.
[Vol. 62:1024
MEDICAL AND DISABILITY COSTS
under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA indicates that the test goes to the es-
tablishment of liability. 182 It is this part of the Mt. Healthy test that
should be reassessed. The following criticism will proceed on the as-
sumption that the "same decision" test of Mt. Healthy applies to the es-
tablishment of liability. The principal rationale for the Mt. Healthy test is
that it merely places the plaintiff in as good a position as he or she would
have been had there been no discriminatory motivation. 183 In judging
employment decisions, courts must balance legitimate employer interests
in an efficient workplace with the protections afforded employees under
federal law. 184 The employee should not be in a "better position" than
other employees merely because the employer was motivated, in part, by
a discriminatory reason.
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment
question resolved against him because of constitutionally protected
conduct. But that same candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in
such conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance
record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that rec-
ord, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more
certain of the correctness of its decision.' 8 5
Furthermore, the Mt. Healthy test adequately protects the constitu-
tional rights of employees by requiring the employer to prove that the
action would have taken place in any case. As commentators have indi-
cated, it is exceedingly difficult to prove a negative-that the decision
would have been different absent the discriminatory motive.' 8 6 Placing
the burden on the party who has access to the required information is
also sensible. Since the employer makes the decision, it should have the
ultimate burden of justifying it or establishing that it would have been
made the same way. 18 7
Nonetheless, there are other strong policy and practical reasons for
rejecting the Mt. Healthy analysis in section 510 cases. First, under the
Mt. Healthy test, conceivably the employer would not be liable under sec-
tion 510 even though interference with existing or future rights under a
benefit plan played a significant part in the employment decision.' 8 8 Em-
ployers are likely to argue that if independent reasons exist for the action
they have not violated the statute. But because the purpose of section
Id. at 285 (emphasis in original). See also Brodin,supra note 151, at 308, 325 n.136; Wolly, l I'hatHath
Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 385 (1980).
182 NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B.
1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
183 Mi. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286; Brodin, supra note 151, at 306-07.
184 ,it. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284.
185 Id. at 286.
186 See Belton, supra note 151, at 1284-87; Brodin, supra note 151, at 307.
187 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); Belton, supra note 151, at 1284; Brodin, supra note
151, at 307 n.69, 321.
188 As commentators have indicated, it is not difficult for an employer to put forward what ap-
pears to be a legitimate reason even if this reason played no part in the adverse employment deci-
sion. The employer simply has to know how to develop a convincing personnel file. As a result, the
plaintiff may have a difficult time refuting such a showing. Brodin, supra note 151. at 321; Tushnet.
Truth, Justice and the American llay: An Jutepretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. I..
REv. 1307, 1355 (1979).
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510 is to prohibit and ultimately eliminate this form of discrimination,
this showing should be sufficient to establish liability. Congress recog-
nized that fringe benefits are crucial to the well-being of employees and
their families, and the only way to protect benefits is to protect the
employment relationship.1 89 Finding liability would deter employers
from making employment decisions on inappropriate grounds. 90
However, the better analysis for section 510 cases is more lenient
than that applied in NLRA section 8(a)(3) or many Title VII cases. 19 1
Under these statutes, the employer can escape liability only if it can show
that the employment action would have occurred for legitimate reasons,
a relatively stringent standard. The analysis under section 510 should be
more liberal. The interference with benefit rights is not more reprehen-
sible than discrimination against people with immutable characteristics
such as race or sex or discrimination against employees for engaging in
union activities. However, both the NLRA and Title VII contain statu-
tory language which prohibits reinstatement or back pay if the employee
was discharged for cause. Therefore, the stricter formulation of the Mt.
Healthy test arguably comports better with these statutory restrictions. 92
By contrast, section 510 and its companion section 502, contain no
189 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
190 The same argument can be made for all federal discrimination laws, but for a discussion of
deterrence and Title VII, see Brodin, supra note 151, at 318-23. If the purpose is to deter discrimi-
nation, it might be better to find liability once the plaintiff can show that the discriminatory motive
played "any part" in the employment decision. With a substantial motive test, an employer could
escape liability if the discriminatory motive played only an insignificant or de minimus part in the
employment action. For example, under § 510, an employer would not be liable if there were 20
other, more significant reasons for the employment action apart from interfering with existing or
future rights under a benefit plan. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. While an "any
part" test is preferred, courts are unlikely to adopt this test for § 510 cases when they are moving
away from this test in Title VII discrimination and retaliation cases. See Brodin, supra note 151, at
293, 301, 308-10. For a view that race is never de minimus, see generally Stonefield, .Von-Detennmina-
live Discrimination, Mixed Motives and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 85, 95
(1986) (discrimination not only involves loss of equal opportunity but also loss of self-respect, confi-
dence, and dignity).
191 The Mt. Healthy test has been adopted by the NLRB and the Supreme Court for § 8(a)(3)
cases. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); Wright Line. 251
N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Du-
Ross, supra note 151.
The analysis employed in mixed-motive cases under Title VII in more recent cases is similar to
the Mt. Healthy test. See, e.g., McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1983); Kauff-
man v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must establish that he or she was
discharged for engaging in protected activities and but for this activity, plaintiff would not have been
terminated); Shanley v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 552 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Ind. 1982). See also
Brodin, supra note 151, at 308-10.
192 NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) states in pertinent part:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who
has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individ-
ual was suspended or discharged for cause.
Section 7 06(g) ofTitle VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) was modeled on NLRA § 10(c) and provides:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a
member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an em-
ployee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission.
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or
discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin or in violation of [section 704(a)].
Even these statutory restrictions could be interpreted only to prohibit or restrict courts from
granting certain remedies in the event that the employer is able to establish an independent reason
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such restrictions. Section 502 permits all forms of equitable and other
relief without any restrictions on or even mention of reinstatement or
back pay. 193 Therefore, courts can take the more liberal view as advo-
cated in this Article. Congress was aware of the restrictions in the NLRA
and Title VII and chose not to include them in ERISA. Furthermore, an
expansive analysis for section 510 cases need not be justified on grounds
that this prohibited discrimination is as bad or worse than other forms of
discrimination prohibited by federal law. Congress enacted this provi-
sion in ERISA to safeguard employee benefits, and what matters is
whether the proposed analysis accomplishes this purpose.' 94
In any case, finding liability after the plaintiff establishes that dis-
for the employment action. Neither provision explicitly prohibits a finding of liability after the plain-
tiff establishes that the dominant motive was discriminatory.
In the Mt. Healthy group of cases, of course, the Supreme Court's mixed-motives analy-
sis is used to establish the defendant's liability in the first place, not simply to determine the
appropriate remedy. If the defendant establishes that it would have made the same deci-
sion in the absence of the illegitimate factor, it wins the case, and the complaint is dis-
missed. Our reading of Title VII is significantly different. In that statute, Congress has
made unlawful any kind of racial discrimination that actually deprives someone of ajob. A
defendant's showing that the plaintiffwould not have gotten the job anyway does not extin-
guish liability. It simply excludes the remedy of retroactive promotion or reinstatement.
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). See also Brodin, supra note 151, at
294-99 (indicating that the legislative history does not resolve the mixed-motive problem in Title VII
actions); but see DuRoss, supra note 151, at 1123-26 (Congress intended to incorporate the dominant
motive test into NLRA § 8(a)(3) actions).
193 Section 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982), states in pertinent part:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) By a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan;...
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, a fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this title or terms of the plan; ....
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended that the court have broad equitable
powers to fashion relief.
The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the Secretary
and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing viola-
tions of the Retirement Income Security for Employees Act as well as the amendments
made to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. The intent of the Committee is to
provide the fidl range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and
to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have ham-
pered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law or recovery of ben-
efits due to participants.
S. Rep. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4871
(emphasis added). See also Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
194 Although I apply the mixed-motive analysis proposed by Brodin, supra note 151, for Title VII
actions, Brodin is critical of applying the same standard to NLRA, Title VII and ADEA actions. In
particular, he argues that race discrimination, the primary focus ofhis article, is significantly different
from discrimination based on age or union activity.
There is a long history of intentionally unequal treatment based on race; race discrimina-
tion is founded on offensive stereotyped characteristics; and the victims of racism constitute
a 'discrete and insular' minority deserving of 'extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian process.'
Id. at 310-11 n.80. Of course, Title VII prohibits more than just racial discrimination; it also prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of sex, religion and national origin. Presumably, Brodin would apply
his analysis at least to sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
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criminatory motive played a significant role in the adverse employment
decision would not require an employer to reinstate the employee, pay
back wages or compensate the employee for lost benefits, nor would it
put the plaintiff in a better position than that of other employees. 195
However, the plaintiff would be entitled to prospective relief, such as an
injunction, court costs, and attorneys' fees. 196 An injuction could be im-
portant to plaintiffs because the employer often has taken similar actions
against other employees; an injunction would prohibit such action in the
future even if other damages are not forthcoming. 197 Furthermore, the
ability to collect attorney's fees is crucial because most plaintiffs would
not be able to afford to bring an action otherwise. As with other federal
antidiscrimination laws, the enforcement of section 510 depends primar-
ily on private initiative. If employees have difficulty proving liability, they
will bring relatively few actions. 198
If, as proposed, the Mt. Healthy test is applied to determine relief, it
is necessary to examine what constitutes legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for terminating medically risky employees. If the employer can-
not prove that it was motivated by legitimate reasons, then there is no
mixed-motive issue. The plaintiff will be entitled to all appropriate reme-
dies, damages, and injunctive relief because the employer was motivated
solely by a discriminatory reason. This result can occur in two ways. The
first occurs where the employer simply cannot articulate any legitimate or
acceptable reason for the adverse action. The second and more common
situation occurs when the plaintiff shows that the employer's reason was
mere pretext; in other words, the reason given is simply untrue.' 99
Courts will most likely viewjob-related reasons as nondiscriminatory
reasons for adverse employment actions. 20 0 For example, the employer
195 See Brodin, supra note 151, at 321-26.
Courts may refuse to reinstate employees even if the employer is unable to show legitimate
reasons for the discharge if the hostility between the employer and the former employee is so great
as to preclude an effective working relationship. See, e.g., Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007,
1018 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (no reinstatement where "plaintiff's prior managerial position requires mu-
tual trust and cooperation which could not be possible in light of the circumstances").
However, if the court refuses to reinstate the plaintiff, it will usually give back pay and occasion-
ally front pay as well. In Folz, the court granted front pay because the plaintiff was already 53 years
old and was suffering from multiple sclerosis. Expert testimony indicated that anyone with this dis-
ease would be unable to work for long periods of time. Front pay was necessary to fully compensate
the plaintiff. 594 F. Supp. at 10 18-19. See Note, Front Pay: A Necessaro Alternative to Reinstatement nd Oer
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (1984).
196 ERISA § 50 2 (g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982), permits the court to grant attorneys' fees
and costs to the prevailing party.
197 See Brodin, supra note 151, at 320, 323-24 for a similar observation in Title VII actions.
198 See Brodin, supra note 151, at 322-23.
199 See Fol, 594 F. Supp. at 1015 (poor performance was pretext for discharge; employer did not
want to pay for plaintiff's medical and disability benefits); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F. Supp.
571, 575 (W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'dhi relevant part, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983) (unauthorized removal of
tools was pretext for firing employee; employer wanted to prevent plaintiff's pension from vesting).
200 Does the employer's reason have to be job-related to be a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son under § 510? If the employer must articulate ajob-related reason, then § 510 will further erode
the employment-at-will doctrine which allows employers to fire people for any reason or no reason
at all. However. § 510 and other antidiscrimination laws have to limit the at-will doctrine to prevent
discrimination against employees within protected classes (race. sex, age, union activity, etc.). The
at-will doctrine has been seriously eroded in recent years and perhaps will not survive. See. e.g.. W.
Ho..owAY & M. LIIK.I, EMPI.OYMENT TERMINvrION: RIGHTS ANt) REMEDIFS 111-14 (1985);
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might argue that the employee's job performance declined or the em-
ployee was absent from work too often because of an illness or injury,
factors with which the employer is legitimately concerned. 20 1 However,
the plaintiff may be able to counter this explanation if he or she can show
that he or she would have been eligible for disability leave and benefits
and was terminated without being given the option of going on leave. 202
However, courts must make an exception if the employee's poor per-
formance is due to drug or alcohol abuse and the job affects the safety
and health of coworkers and the public. But even in these situations, the
action may be discriminatory if the employer provides a drug and alcohol
rehabilitation program and if employees are allowed to take disability
leaves for these conditions. 203
Other reasons which appear to be job-related may not withstand
scrutiny because the reason violates the Rehabilitation Act or other fed-
eral law. The employer might, for example, argue that an employee with
AIDS could not work effectively with coworkers or the public because of
the latter's unwarranted fears of contracting the disease from casual con-
tact.20 4 Assuming that discharging an employee with AIDS is ultimately
found to violate the Rehabilitation Act, courts should not permit an em-
ployer to argue that it can fire an employee with AIDS because coworkers
or the public have unwarranted fears of contagion. Moreover, a positive
test result for the AIDS antibody does not guarantee that a person will
contract the disease.205 Technically, ERISA protects employees and fam-
ily members from interference with benefits, not other forms of discrimi-
nation. Nonetheless, ERISA should not undermine other discrimination
laws. 20 6 If this view is adopted, employers may simply have to educate
their workforce about the facts of certain illnesses.
Other supposed job-related reasons do not concern contagion but
center on voluntary lifestyle choices that primarily endanger the individ-
ual who makes them. An employer might argue that it screens for
unhealthful lifestyles both to encourage employees to adopt good health
habits and to avoid having to deal with risky workers later.20 7 Courts
Goldberg, The Duly of Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89, 154-57
(1985); Note, Protecting Employees at VillAgainst Wrongful Discharge: The Public PoliO
, 
Exception, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 1931 (1983); Note, Defining Public Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981).
While employers need the flexibility to make employment decisions, it is not burdensome to require
the employer to articulate a job-related reason for a decision. The at-will rule encourages arbitrary
decisions which affect the worklives and careers of employees. Ifthe employer cannot articulate such
a reason, then this failure should create an inference that a discriminatory reason exists.
201 As indicated earlier, many companies carefully regulate excused absences to reduce malinger-
ing. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 105-07.
203 See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
206 Obviously, the employer is not likely to articulate a reason which will make it liable under
other discrimination laws. However, it is possible that the plaintiff may not be able to bring an action
under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act if the statute of limitations has run. In that instance, the
employer may risk little by articulating such a reason. Such reasons should not be valid under § 510
even if this provision only protects plaintiffs from retaliation or interference with their rights under
benefit plans.
207 See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
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should reject such broad grounds; otherwise, ERISA would afford little
protection. Few people have totally healthful lifestyles. Genetically-
based vulnerability should be rejected for the same reason-no one can
change his or her genetic make-up if it turns out that they are genetically
susceptible to certain illnesses. 208 After all, the purpose of insurance is to
cover illnesses and injuries when they occur. The employer should not
be able to use these broad reasons to prevent plaintiffs from fully recov-
ering for the loss of benefits. They come close to amounting to a "cost
defense," which, if permitted, would vitiate ERISA in a most undesirable
way.
Analogous "cost defense grounds" have been raised in cases stem-
ming from plant closings and layoffs. In Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. ,209
for example, the employer instituted a program which targeted employ-
ees who were close to qualifying for plant shutdown pensions. The
Third Circuit found that the employer decided to close plants and lay off
employees to reduce the number eligible for these pensions. 210 While
the employer can shut down plants or lay off employees because of loss
of business, it should not be able to do so simply because their benefits
will cost more than others. Employers already face possible charges of
age discrimination when they target older employees with higher wages,
salaries and benefits. 21' ERISA mandates similar protection for em-
208 See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 197-20 1; Note, Employment Discrimination Implica-
tions of Genetic Screening in the Workplace Under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, 10 AM. J. L. & MED. 323
(1985).
209 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987). Unlike many discrimination cases, plaintiffs had direct evidence
of the company's discriminatory motives to reduce its pension eligibility. Id. at 856-57. As business
declined, Continental Can instituted a "cap and shrink" program in the mid-1970s to reduce its
liability for plant shutdown benefits. Plant shutdown pension benefits are triggered for senior em-
ployees in the event of a plant closing. The "cap and shrink" program laid off employees who were
close to vesting and kept all employees with enough years of service and age to qualify for their
benefits. With the aid of computers, the company kept track of all employees. It ran a line through
the seniority chart to indicate what employees had to be laid off and who could not be recalled to
service. In addition, if plant managers wanted to recall an employee below the line, the head office
had to approve the decision. Continental also shifted work to plants with low pension liability or to
plants with a high proportion of employees with vested benefits. Id. at 840-42.
210 Id. at 850-66. Even though the district court found that Continental was substantially moti-
vated by a desire to avoid pension liability, it still found in favor of the employer on the grounds that
the plants would have been closed anyway for other legitimate business reasons. Id. at 841-42. The
opinion apparently places the burden of proving that the same decision would not have occurred for
legitimate reasons on the plaintiff. As indicated, this burden is far more onerous than is required
under the Mt. Healthy test. See supra notes 177-98 and accompanying text. For this reason, the Third
Circuit overturned the district court and appeared to adopt the Mt. Healthy test. Plaintiffs met their
burden by establishing that Continental's actions were substantially motivated by a "desire to pre-
vent pension eligibility." 812 F.2d at 863.
The policy in dispute in Gavalik was also the subject of class actions in California and New
Jersey. See Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984); McLendon v. Continental
Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J. 1985).
211 Usually older employees with greater seniority have accumulated the years of service neces-
sary to qualify for pension and other expensive benefits. Furthermore, older employees are more
susceptible to serious illnesses which incur larger medical and disability costs (heart disease, cancer,
etc.) As a result, termination may also violate the Age Discrimination Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982). See, e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984) (steel company violated Age Discrimination Act when it terminated the
four highest paid salespeople who also had higher pension, insurance and social security costs);
Powers, Reductions in Form 'uder the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 2 LAB. LAw. 197, 202-05
(1986). Butsee Holley v. Sanyo Mfg, Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1168 (8th Cir. 1985) (employee terminated
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ployee benefits. Otherwise, few employees in declining industries will
have benefits when they most need them. During difficult times employ-
ers would naturally want to discharge employees whose benefits cost
more than others.
In summary, courts should carefully scrutinize the employer's evi-
dence that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of
discriminatory motive. What appear to be job-related reasons should not
withstand scrutiny if the employee is eligible to take disability leave or
enter rehabilitation programs provided under benefit programs and if
these reasons violate other federal discrimination laws. The cost of ben-
efits or the health of employees themselves should also not be acceptable
reasons. If these reasons are viewed as nondiscriminatory, it would be
impossible to protect insurance or any other benefits under section 510.
2. Pattern and Practice Cases
As in Title VII and ADEA cases, plaintiffs may bring class actions
challenging employer actions as part of a "pattern and practice" of inter-
ference with existing or future rights under a benefit plan. 21 2 Class
actions may arise when employers take adverse employment actions as a
result of medical, genetic or drug testing or any other program that
targets medically risky employees. 213 Although the plaintiff's case would
be structured differently in a pattern and practice case, the general analy-
sis developed earlier would still apply. The mixed-motive analysis possi-
bly works even better in a class action than in an individual case. For one
thing, courts often bifurcate class actions into liability and remedial
stages or phases for reasons ofjudicial management. 214 Applying a dif-
ferent analysis to the liability and remedial phases should present few
difficulties. Also, if the employer is able to show the same decision would
have been made for nondiscriminatory reasons, then the plaintiffs are
even more concerned with injunctive relief which would be needed to
put an end to the discriminatory practice. The Supreme Court has held
that when plaintiffs establish class wide violations, the defendant must
establish that the violation did not cause the individual job losses.215
Apart from the differences between the plaintiff's cases in individual and
in pattern and practice suits, the defenses should be similar to those dis-
cussed in the previous section.
Although there are few class action cases under section 510, the
large body of case law under Title VII provides a general framework for
because position was eliminated; mere fact that a lower paid employee replaced him did not establish
age discrimination); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1411-12
(7th Cir. 1984) (even if cost-cutting was a motivation for the discharge of older employee, this may
not violate ADEA).
212 See SCIILEI AND GROSSMAN. supra note 151, at 1322-24.
213 See supra notes 43-107 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977); 4 NEWBERG ON C1x.ss Ac-
TIONS § 24.120 (2d ed. 1985).
215 See, e.g., Teansteg, 431 U.S. at 360-61 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
771-73 (1976); ScIu..I AND GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 1322.
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pattern and practice cases. 216 As with individual actions, plaintiffs rarely
have direct evidence of the discriminatory motive but must establish it by
circumstantial evidence. To establish liability, the plaintiff must show
that a pattern or practice of discrimination exists, and "that the pattern
or practice of differential treatment is the [employer's] regular and stan-
dard operating procedure." 217 Plaintiffs usually prove this in two ways.
First, plaintiffs may present evidence of individual instances of discrimi-
nation against class representatives. Proving the individual cases of dis-
crimination would be accomplished in the ways described in the previous
section. 21 8 However, plaintiffs need not establish that each member of
the class suffered similar discrimination in order to show that there was a
discriminatory policy.21 9 In addition, plaintiffs may show discrimination
by presenting statistical evidence. 220 Plaintiffs may have less difficulty in
obtaining this sort of data in an ERISA action than in other actions be-
cause employers are required to keep detailed records if they administer
benefit plans. 22' In addition, employees will not have difficulty establish-
ing a policy if the employer conducts medical or other tests and takes
action against all workers who test positively. 222
As indicated earlier, justifying medical or other screening devices
will be difficult if these are not job related. For example, employers will
find it difficult to justify testing for the AIDS antibodies because the test
is unreliable and there is no evidence that the disease can be spread by
casual contact at the workplace. 223 The employer is likely to defend such
testing on grounds other than reducing benefits costs. But other rea-
sons, such as fear of contagion, have no medical justification and may, on
their own, violate federal and state handicap laws. 224 Considering such
reasons legitimate under ERISA would not promote the goal of eliminat-
ing discrimination.
Genetic screening would face similar hurdles. Even if testing is relia-
ble enough to show that an employee has a risk of contracting certain
serious diseases such as heart disease, multiple sclerosis, and cancer, few
occupational reasons exist to make employment decisions on the basis of
genetic propensity. 225 Even if the test results are used to minimize the
incidence of occupational diseases, commentators have severely criti-
cized the use of genetic or other medical testing as a way of evading the
responsibility of providing a safe workplace. 226
Although the literature indicates that employers are concerned
about the medical and disability costs of alcohol and drug abuse, employ-
216 SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, supra note 15 1, at 1322-24. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Teamslers, 431 U.S. 324.
217 SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 1322. See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
218 See supra notes 160-211 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 215.
220 SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, supra note 151, at 1322-23.
221 See disclosure and reporting requirements in ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
222 The employers will keep records of test results in employee files. See supra note 74.
223 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 57 for a discussion of liability under the handicap discrimination laws.
225 See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 69, 197.
226 See sources cited supra note 43.
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ees may have difficulty establishing that drug and alcohol testing discrim-
inates against them in violation of section 510.227 Employers do not
usually justify the testing because of increased medical or disability costs.
Rather employers justify drug and alcohol testing because of concerns
about job performance, absenteeism, theft and safety. Drug use will be
treated more severly than alcohol abuse because drugs are usually illegal
and their use is an indication of deviant or undesirable behavior.228 But,
if the alcohol or drug abuse does not endangerjob performance orjeop-
ardize the safety and health of the public, then discharging someone for
this addiction may violate federal and some state handicapped laws. The
employer's rationale should be rio more legitimate under ERISA.229
As indicated earlier, many tests do not accurately measure drug and
alcohol abuse. They yield a large number of false positives.23 0 If the
tests are as unreliable as reported, a positive result should not enable the
employer to satisfy its burden of proof.
In addition, the employer may find it difficult to justify discharging
an employee if the employer provides drug and alcohol treatment pro-
grams and the employee is eligible for such programs but he or she is
discharged instead. 23' As with other disability programs, the employer
should not be able to promise employees that they can enter the pro-
grams and then not allow employees in need to use them. Such pro-
grams can be costly, and preventing affected employees from using the
program could be strong evidence that the employer was substantially
227 See sources cited supra note 88.
228 See Rothstein, supra note 88, at 423.
229 The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals by the government and by private
employers receiving federal funds. The Act defines a handicap as "a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, [or] ... has a record of
such an impairment, or... is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B), does,' however, exclude an alcoholic or drug
abuser from the protection of the statute if: "an alcoholic or drug abuser['s] . . . current use of
alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose
employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others."
Therefore, an alcoholic or drug abuser would be protected under the Rehabilitation Act if their
condition did not affect job performance nor present a safety hazard to other employees or the
public. See Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1985) (employer violated the Rehabili-
tation Act by considering "pretreatment transgressions" of alcohol in decision to discharge em-
ployee); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (City of Philadelphia's across-the-board
policy of refusing to hire any former or current drug users violated Rehabilitation Act); Whitaker v.
Board of Higher Educ., 451 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (college professor's claim that he was
denied tenure due to alcoholism stated cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act).
While there are few reported cases, many state handicap laws would regard alcoholism and drug
addiction as handicaps. See, e.g., Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 3d 279, 496 N.E. 2d
478 (1986); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 86
Wis. 2d 393, 273 N.W.2d 206 (1979). Wilson, supra note 57, at 650.
California requires employers with 25 or more employees to allow employees to take time off
from work to enter alcohol treatment programs. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1025-1028 (West 1972); Wil-
son, supra note 57, at 650.
230 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
231 Drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs are common in benefit programs. Geidt, supra note
91, at 186-87; Rothstein, supra note 88, at 434-35.
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motivated by a desire to deprive employees of benefits. 23 2
3. Plan Termination
An employer can deprive employees of benefits and avoid liability
under section 510 simply by terminating the medical and disability bene-
fit plan entirely. In that event, the purposes of section 510 in protecting
participants and beneficiaries from loss of benefits collide with another
policy under ERISA, the freedom given employers not to provide bene-
fits at all. 233 Employers can generally terminate welfare benefits
(although not pensions) with few restrictions unless they have contractu-
ally bound themselves not to do so. 234 Therefore, an employer could
argue that plan termination does not violate section 510 or any other
part of ERISA even though the termination may intentionally deprive
participants and beneficiaries of their benefits.
It is unclear how courts will handle plan terminations under ERISA.
Thus far, only two cases address the issue. In Aronson v. Servus Rubber,
Division of Chromalloy,235 the First Circuit held that partial plan termina-
tion did not violate section 510 because other provisions of ERISA per-
mit this kind of termination and because the plan termination had "a
readily apparent business justification. '' 23 6 The company terminated the
part of the plan that covered employees in the plant that was shut
down. 237 According to Aronson, it is possible that the employer might
violate section 510 if the partial termination was done solely to deprive a
group of employees likely to need or to qualify for the benefits in the
near future. 23 8
This situation occurred in Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 239 where
the company terminated a severance pay plan just before a group of em-
ployees were to be laid off and before they would have collected the ben-
efits. 240 The district court never addressed the section 510 issue, and
found for the plaintiffs under a different theory-that the employer, as
232 This analysis assumes that the employee has not been guilty of any other serious misconduct
as a result of the drug or alcohol abuse.
233 Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part: Vesting of Retiree Insurance, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 183, 225 (1987). See
generally Barnes & Mishkind, Retiree Health and Welfare Benefits: Controversy Over Their Duration, 10 EMPL.
REL. L.J. 584, 592 (1985). See also Murphy v. Heppenstall, 635 F.2d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1980) (ERISA
provides the minimum; employers can provide more than is required under the Act).
234 See Title IV of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), which regulates
pension plan termination.
Courts have often found that employers cannot terminate retiree insurance plans for employees
who have already retired because plans were generally established as status or lifetime benefits. As
long as the employee remains retired, he or she would continue to receive benefits for life. See, e.g.,
Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 725 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); Hansen v. White Farms Equip. Co., 5 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2130 (N.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd on other gronds, 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986);
Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Vogel, supra note 233, at
203-16.
235 730 F.2d 12 (lst Cir. 1984). See also Martucci & Utz, Unlawful Inteference With Protected Rights
Under ERISA, 2 LAB. LAW. 251, 258-60 (1985-86).
236 730 F.2d at 16.
237 Id. at 13-15.
238 Id. at 16.
239 491 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd in pertinent part, 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981).
240 Id. at 1189-93.
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fiduciary, violated its duties under ERISA to act "solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries." '24' The court held that ERISA is
designed to protect employee benefits and does not permit termination
of any employee to prevent the attainment of any rights to which the
employee may become entitled especially when the termination deprives
employees of their benefits just as they are about to qualify for them.242
Employees may also be able to argue that contract principles pro-
hibit termination under these circumstances. These arguments have been
used with some success in retiree insurance cases. 243 It is debatable,
however, whether section 510 is designed to prohibit plan termination
where it is otherwise permissible. Congress may ultimately have to con-
sider restricting welfare plan terminations to avoid this kind of termina-
tion in the future. 244
IV. Conclusion
Concern with the increased costs of medical and disability insurance
benefits coupled with advances in medical and genetic testing create a
strong incentive for employers to cut costs by targeting and eliminating
employees at risk of contracting serious illness. This Article shows that
section 510 of ERISA provides relief if the employees or family members
can establish that the adverse employment action was taken, in substan-
tial part, to interfere with existing or future rights under an employee
benefit plan. The case law thus far has provided little guidance on the
burdens and elements of proof in section 510 claims. Adapting analytical
approaches from other federal discrimination law, this Article proposes
that courts treat the liability and remedial phases of the action separately.
At the liability phase in an individual or a class action, plaintiffs should be
required to show that interference with existing or future benefits rights
was a substantial or motivating factor behind the employer's employment
decision. At the remedial stage, the employer should be permitted to
show that it would have made the same decision on independent, nondis-
criminatory grounds. If such a showing is made, the plaintiff's remedies
are limited to injunctive relief, court costs and attorneys' fees. If not, the
plaintiff should be entitled to all appropriate equitable and legal relief.
This analysis would promote the purposes of ERISA by finding liability if
the discriminatory motive played a significant part in the adverse employ-
ment action, and at the same time it would not require the employer to
reinstate or pay other damages if it can establish independent grounds
for the action.
With the passage of ERISA, Congress recognized the importance of
241 ERISA § 404(1), 29 U.S.C. § I104(a)(1) (1982). See also Falstaff Brewing, 491 F. Supp. at 1197.
242 Falstaff Brewing, 491 F. Supp. at 1197; Martucci & Utz, supra note 233, at 258-60.
Retirees have made similar arguments when the employer reduced or terminated retiree health
and welfare plans. See cases cited supra note 234. See also Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1483 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (employer violated fiduciary duty to follow plan documents when it
reduced benefits when plan documents indicated that reductions or termination could only occur in
the event of financial hardship); Vogel, supra note 233, at 206-16.
243 See supra notes 235-42.
244 For a discussion of such a proposal for retiree insurance benefits, see Vogel, supra note 233, at
231-40.
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employee benefits to the welfare of employees and their families. Medi-
cal and disability benefits, the focus in this Article, are crucial to the
worker's well-being in the event of illness or injury. Medical insurance
today is the ticket to health care in this country-few can receive medical
treatment without it. Disability benefits replace lost income if an illness
or accident causes an employee to miss work for any period of time.
They are the means by which families under these circumstances can
maintain a decent standard of living. In an era of cost-consciousness, the
expansive analysis proposed in this Article will cushion employees and
their families from unwarranted loss of benefits in times of urgent need.
